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ABSTRACT

ISLAND O F TRANQUILITY: RHETORIC AND IDENTIFICATION AT
BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY DURING T H E VIETNAM ERA

Brian D. Jackson
Department of English
Master of English

The author argues that beyond religious beliefs and conservative politics, rhetorical
identification played an important role in the relative calmness of the BYU campus during
the turbulent Sixties. Using Bitzer's rhetorical situation theory and Burke's identification
theory, the author shows that BYU's calm campus can be explained as a result of communal
identification with a conservative ethos. He also shows that apparent epistemological
shortcomings of Bitzer's model can be resolved by considering the power of identification to
create salience and knowledge in rhetorical situations. During the Sixties, BYU
administration developed policies on physical appearance that invited students to take on a
conservative identity, and therefore a conservative behavior. Relationships of power and
hierarchy at BYU can be understood not as quantitative and oppressive matrices, but as
rhetorical choices of students to identify with the character of school president, Ernest
Wilkinson, and the administration. Power, then, is as Foucault envisioned it—as a field
wherein identity and discourse are negotiated. This thesis argues for a more broad

understanding of identification, ethos, and power for explaining rhetorical behavior in
communal situations.
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INTRODUCTION
T h e Island of Tranquility
In January 1969, US News and World Report ran an article about Brigham Y o u n g
University tided "A University Without Trouble." T h e summary heading read as follows:
N o "hippies," miniskirts or riots make the scene at Brigham Young University. T h e
M o r m o n school is an oasis of calm amidst campus turmoil. Its secret: high
standards, strict discipline. (58)
T h e article continued with a surprising revelation: "At a time when students everywhere
seem to be on the warpath, Brigham Y o u n g University is undisturbed. It has never had a
serious demonstration" (58). BYU's tranquility, the report explained, was due to its
connection to the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints (the sponsoring religion) and
the high admission standards required to attend: Students could not smoke or drink, they
had to obey a dress code, and any student participating in a riot, a la Berkeley, would be
suspended or expelled. T h e report then quoted Dr. and Mrs. Reeves w h o donated a milliondollar ranch in California to BYU after visiting the campus: "The young people at BYU were
all clean-cut, good-looking. There was n o beatnik atmosphere. Those students had their feet
on the ground. Instead of finding fault, they were accepting leadership" (58). The school
seemed to have its hiccups and its micro-rebellions (the article indicates that 13 students
were expelled for marijuana use or sale in 1967), but generally speaking, US News decided
that Brigham Young University was "a peaceful university in a time of turbulence" (59).
In spite of the tendency for media, then as m u c h as now, to exaggerate the
"turbulence" of the Sixties, with burning campuses filled with students everywhere " o n the
warpath," and in spite of the concession that there were thousands of universities besides
BYU that did not have large-scale disturbances as did Columbia or Berkeley, there must have
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been something starkly unique about the atmosphere of BYU during the Sixties that set it
apart from the other relatively mild schools. US News and World Reportwas n o t the only news
source that noticed. Media heavy hitters like Christian Science Monitor, the Los Angeles Times and
the Chicago Tribune ("As the dust settles at some campuses and others prepare to meet their
own unmakers," wrote the Tribune, "it is refreshing to take a look at Brigham Y o u n g
University in Provo, Utah . . ."), also carried stories about BYU's almost religious patriotism
and the absence of agitation and revolt o n its campus.
Religion, however, does not completely explain BYU's calm during the "days of
rage." A t its core, Brigham Young University achieved a communal consensus
unprecedented in the 1960s educational front, perhaps even unprecedented in the history of
American higher education. Behind the tranquility was group cohesion and a c o m m o n
identity that dictated h o w the character of the university would be defined and h o w
rhetorical discourse worked to create meaning, identity and action. H o w BYU's students,
faculty, and administration, functioning collectively as a unique religious polis and discourse
community, managed the exchange of symbols during the Sixties says m u c h about how they
defined themselves and how that definition would direct (and, in this case, hedge) action.
That core identity became the governing force behind much of what the BYU community
said and did during the Sixties.
This paper is an attempt to explain the contextually strange calm at BYU during the
Sixties using contemporary rhetorical theory. With the revival and scholastic triumph of
rhetoric in the last half of the twentieth century, scholars have used its vocabulary and its
constructs to inquire into a miscellany of subjects and texts, from landscape to scientific
revolutions. It is appropriate, and quite enlightening, to seek from theory new explanations
for old events, especially from the historical record. However, before rhetorical theory can
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be used advantageously to discuss BYU in the Sixties, we must first look at the historicalrhetorical situation more fully. If it is true that, as Eugene Wliite explains, all discourse
should be explored as "historical configuration" or as the continuation of antecedent messages
and events that make up the exigential flow of rhetorical situations (25), then we must
precede our theoretical applications with the historical configuration.
Exploring the Sixties with even a modicum of objectivity seems impossible for
scholars. Alan Kors has complained that scholarship of the Sixties (roughly from 1964-1974)
is "our national Rorschach test" and tends to be "tendentious, partisan, ardent, and
obsessive," sometimes even vengeful (1). Two keystone texts of the era, Todd Gitlin's The
Sixties and Kenneth Heineman's Put Your Bodies Upon the Wheels, illustrate this polarity well.
Gitlin's encomium of the New Left sees the radical social movement as a holy, though
incomplete Reformation, while Heineman believes that we are still suffering from the
Saturnalia of sex, drugs and violence that the radical counter-culture produced. Approaching
such a loaded and polarizing subject as the Sixties with some fairness is the burden of
contemporary scholars and theorists.
Not since the Civil War has there been a time in our history when conflicts both
within and without polarized the nation and induced such fiery polemic, and continue to do
so. In one commentator's words, the Vietnam Era "divided father and son, intellectual and
hard hat, hawk and dove, peacenik mother and John Wayne father" (MacPherson 29). The
polarization and fragmentation that came with the cultural vitriol of the Sixties was felt most
acutely on college campuses, where all the tense abstractions like free speech, sexuality,
human rights and peace were engaged by a strident leftist minority and then propelled (and
eventually adopted) into mainstream communication. Universities became laboratories for
democratic dialectic; widely accepted ideas about morality, militarism, race and foreign policy
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were confronted with oceans of words printed in pamphlets and journals, aired on radio and
television waves, and in the campus air, shouted from stepladders.
The exigential flow of the "Campus Wars," as Heineman calls them in another work,
picked up its mercurial energy from Berkeley in 1964 when students protested administrative
action against fiery political speech on campus. At the time, the impetus of the Berkeley Free
Speech Movement was not foreign policy (such as the US involvement in Southeast Asia)
but campus policy, particularly the issue of in loco parentis, or the idea that the administrator
was substitute for parental discipline. Heineman reports that twenty five percent of
America's colleges and universities experienced protests against the heavy-handed presence
of school administration (Bodies Upon the Wheels 106). Students felt that the classical age of
the college president as "the academic father and students as the dutiful children" must die
(Bloustein 46). (I will address the concept of in loco parentis further in chapter three.)
In 1965, the year Lyndon B. Johnson began the bombing mission "Operation
Rolling Thunder" against North Vietnam and sent the first two Marine battalions to South
Vietnam, students and faculty at Michigan held a "moratorium," the first of its kind, to
protest the war in Vietnam and the university's Department of Defense contracts. Similar
stirrings began that year in Pennsylvania, and the next year at Wisconsin, Rutgers, SUNYBuffalo and other universities, both students and faculty responding to what was believed to
be an immoral and destructive conflict. During the Sixties, three hundred of the two
thousand campuses in America experienced "sit-ins, building takeovers, riots, and strikes,"
and that is only counting the more volatile and violent outbursts (Heineman 1). It is possible
that every major campus in America experienced some kind of backlash or protest, some
kind of antigovernment dialogue in its media organs, however small. In the spring of 1970,
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1300 universities experienced protest of some kind, and 900 universities had to shut down
until fall because of anti-Vietnam student strikes (Heineman 176).
Much of the foment was caused by young, upper-middle-class communists, the socalled "red diaper babies," whose idealism and social consciousness led to the formation of
SDS, Students for a Democratic Society, which then spread chapters across the nation's
campuses. By 1968, SDS had one hundred thousand members on three hundred campuses
(Heineman 150). SDS rejected its liberal democratic forefathers (like Kennedy) and
established a new political style both radical and participatory (Gitlin 135). In their ideology
they taught that student activists must put their bodies on the line to stop the government
war machine. In 1967, when forty-nine percent of students nationally favored escalation of the
war in Vietnam, SDS and other student groups across the nation moved from protest to
resistance.
It is easy to forget two points about campus protest that become marred by time and
media hype: 1) The majority of university students did not protest, did not participate in sitins or teach-ins or death-ins (students painting their faces like skulls and lying down in
groups like corpses), did not seek to destroy the campus ROTC presence, etc. (see Van Dyke
205); and, 2) Most of the students who did protest were educated, upper-middle class who
felt no real threat of conscription to Vietnam because of the relative ease of getting a
deferment (see Baskir and Strauss 20-23). This last point has much to do with the intensity
of young male protest against the war: self-survival was the reason behind the rhetoric. As
Neil Sheehan has noted,
the threat of being conscripted for a war that was the object of widespread moral
revulsion made marchers and shouters out of young men who might otherwise have
been less concerned over the victimization of Asian people or the turning into
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cannon fodder of farm boys and the sons of the working class and the
minorities. (717)
In terms of rhetoric, Sheehan's c o m m e n t can be viewed as a direct application of situational
orientation that theorist K e n n e t h Burke discusses in Permanence and Change. T h e chance and
circumstance of the draft created a rhetorical situation "marked by conflict" and the
"aggravated crises of conscience" that led to patterns of behavior in the students, that in turn
revealed rhetorical motives (30). In terms of identification, we could say that many protesters
identified against the Vietnam draft by joining the anti-war movement, rather than explicitly
identifying directly with the m o v e m e n t itself.
Burkean scholars would recognize this rhetorical move as the irony of identification
and dissociation (RM 34). W h e n identification takes place, there is always an implied division
(22). T h e flip side of what T o d d Gitlin, once-SDS president, claimed was the "supercharged
density" of the antiwar movement, where "lives were b o u n d up with one another, making
claims on one another, drawing one another into the c o m m o n project," was the ultimate
rejection of any identification with the "the system," which was the N e w Left's straw man
for all that it despised, including the government, the war, school administration, or anyone
over thirty (Gitlin 184). A great portion of the movement's most biting rhetorical discourse
was directed at this straw man and identifying against it, rather than at uniting the disparate
groups. T h o u g h activists "referred to their actions as part of 'The M o v e m e n t ' — n o t the civil
rights movement, not the student movement, b u t a larger movement," it is clear that this
unity was illusionary (Van Dyke 208). As the Sixties peaked, the " m o v e m e n t " became a
hydra of competing and clashing groups ranging from Castroists, socialists, black militants,
feminists and weatherman terrorists, w h o shared n o commonality at all other than
frustration with the war in Vietnam (see Collier and Horowitz 145).
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Because of the scholarship of Burke, contemporary rhetorical theorists take
particular interest in what Burke calls "consubstantiality" a m o n g groups—the substance or
" c o m m o n spirit" that communicating groups "share in c o m m o n " (RM 21). Put simply, the
best way to get something done rhetorically is to make clear the consubstantial elements
shared by rhetors and audiences alike. T h o u g h I will discuss this in more depth in the next
chapter, I find it fitting to introduce the concept in the context of the Sixties and " T h e
Movement(s)." As noted above, there was, first, a schism between the activists and their
government which made consubstantiality seemingly impossible, and second, an illusionary
unity among ideologically disparate groups, which made consubstantiality tenuous at best.
Much of the rhetorical tension of the Sixties, I believe, is due to this failure to identify and to
articulate true consubstantiality within T h e Movement. (And, conversely, the rhetorical
calmness of BYU during the Sixties is due to the success of the community in securing
identification and consubstantiality. More on this later.)
1968 was the year in which all these tensions reached a critical density and exploded.
During Tet, the Vietnamese celebration of the lunar new year, the communists launched a
surprise attack on American installations in South Vietnam. T h o u g h American forces
repelled the Viet Cong in the attack, the complete surprise and fury of Tet stunned
Americans w h o watched the batde every night on television. T h e country had been led to
believe that America was summarily winning the war, that the end of the bitter conflict was
in sight, but the '68 Tet Offensive snapped the credibility of the country's leaders and cast
doubt on inevitable victory. Having been informed of Tet, Walter Cronkite, w h o represented
the enlightened moral strength of the country, asked, "What the hell is going on? I thought
we were winning this war" (Gitlin 299). University students were then joined in their distaste
of the war by a larger number of m o r e moderate citizens w h o felt they had been lied to.
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Also inl968, both Martin Luther King and Robert Kennedy were assassinated. After
the death of King, it seemed to Gitlin that "nonviolence went to the grave with him, and the
movement was 'free at last' from restraint" (306). The student anti-war movement, though
grounded initially in virtuous ideals like equality and peace, escalated into a period of
violence and irrationality in some cases, and outright terrorism in others. From 1968 to 1970,
students at some universities seized buildings and took teachers hostage, set off bombs and
burned facilities, attacked police officers at conventions, terrorized Selective Service and
ROTC offices, and launched strikes that shut down entire schools.
For many student protestors, the time for rhetorical exchange was over. Their
willingness to rage and commit violence, sometimes just "for the hell of it" as Tom Hayden
of SDS said, marked the end of their willingness to discuss differences through reasonable
symbolic exchange. Wayne Booth recognized this breakdown of rhetoric at the University of
Chicago where the student independent press contained "no hint that one might make use
of argument" to explain the reasons behind the antiwar stance (4). Booth's complaint was
that dogmatic, almost thoughdess and animalistic, opinions had ossified to the point where
public discourse was no longer an attempt to reason together but a battlefield where
opponents mindlessly attacked each other (36-37). The students' war of identification against
"the system" was in Burke's terms "a disease, or perversion of communion," rather than a
unified effort to act in accordance with shared ideals (RM 22). In other words, the
disharmony and disunity among student protestors were glossed over by a tenuous
communion against the war effort. Major ideological differences among activist groups could
be set aside in favor of united rage.
Again, we must not fall into the all-too-convenient trap of thinking that all or even a
majority of college students behaved this way in the rhetorical situation created by the

9
Vietnam War. Even at Columbia in 1968, when SDS and the militant Afro-American Society
seized and occupied one dormitory and the university library, two-thirds of the
undergraduates kept cool heads and opposed the outrageous militant actions (Heineman
141). However, by the late Sixties, and especially after Tet, it was obvious that the majority
of American students, though opposed to the disruptive and violent acts of student
protestors, did not support America's war in Vietnam and favored withdrawal.
The uniqueness of Brigham Young University's discursive practices during the
mercurial Sixties lies in its almost unanimous identification with conservative leadership
(embodied in the Nixon administration) and against student protest (embodied in SDS).
During the Sixties, President Ernest Wilkinson and his administration cooperated
rhetorically with the student body to create the calm, conservative atmosphere that captured
media attention and established BYU as an "oasis of peace" amidst academic anarchy, as
Wilkinson's biographers noted (Deem and Bird 418). When interviewed about why there
were no demonstrations or sit-ins or the like at BYU, Wilkinson said that the students there
had been raised to be obedient, were more mature than students at other schools, and
recognized that attending the highly selective, church-sponsored school was an honor and a
privilege, not a right (Deem and Bird 421-422). However true those three characteristics may
be, I suggest that they are not adequate for understanding the complete rhetorical forces at
work on campus.
For the rest of this thesis, I will use Brigham Young University as a case study in the
dynamics of Lloyd Bitzer's revised situational theory and Kenneth Burke's concept of
identification to explain, in part, how it is that BYU experienced such quietude during the
Sixties. It is my argument that throughout the rhetorical crisis of the Vietnam Era the
administration, the faculty, and the students of BYU, both consciously and unconsciously,
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identified themselves in their discursive practices as a conservative, obedient, patriotic and
tranquil institution, opposed to the antiwar movement and the rebellious counterculture the
movement spawned. In fact, identification worked so effectively at BYU that in the late
Sixties the university attracted national attention from major news media like US News and
World Report. In the next three chapters I will analy2e three aspects of identification at
Brigham Young University that contributed to the peaceful atmosphere in the "time [or
situation] of turbulence." In the first chapter I discuss Lloyd Bitzer's situational theory, its
philosophical weaknesses and its recent revisions, and I will explain how Kenneth Burke's
theory of identification makes a more realistic episteme in situational theory. In chapter two
I explain the conservative identity BYU sought to achieve through its rhetorical dress
standard. Finally, in chapter three I will look at how the administrative power to control
discursive practices during the Vietnam Era led to the formation and solidification of group
identity, opinion, and action.
The article about Brigham Young University in the US News and World Report
concludes with a telling experience involving Ernest Wilkinson, the president of BYU during
the Vietnam Era. In September 1968—the year the North Vietnamese communists launched
a surprise attack during the Tet holiday and Americans began to lose their faith in the
government and turn to protest and violence—in an opening assembly, Wilkinson asked all
the students who were willing to maintain law and order to stand: "As far as could be
determined, all stood. Then he called for dissenters to stand. None did" (59).
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CHAPTER O N E
U n i t i n g Souls: E p i s t e m o l o g y and Situational Theory
Rhetorical theory has given us the tools we can use to explore how the BYU
community's management of symbols created the tranquil atmosphere that captured media
attention. Though, I must concede, theory probably will n o t yield any definite answers about
why many other college students rebelled and BYU's did not, at least it presents a vocabulary
with which we can view possible motives behind discursive practices. In this study I rely
primarily on the situational theory of Lloyd Bitzer (and its revisions by later scholars) and the
theory of identification by Kenneth Burke to explain some of the discourse that pacified the
campus of Brigham Young University in the Sixties. I will argue that in rhetorical situations,
such as the situation of BYU in the Sixties, where meaning and knowledge are created
cooperatively, the most salient force for meaning and action is the identification of the
rhetor with the auditors.
Bitzer explained his situational theory of communication in the seminal article " T h e
Rhetorical Situation," published in Philosophy and Rhetoric m 1968. T h e nature of the theory is
context, discourse is rhetorical only when it is generated by a situation in time and space
involving "persons, events, objects, relations" and an exigence that demands some kind of
appropriate response (5). Bitzer uses the word exigence as "an imperfection marked by
urgency," or in other words, that which is "other than it should b e " in a situation (6). T h e
exigence invites the discourse that must b e directed to a particular audience, and that
audience must have the power to change the situation or fix the problem (8). Since the
exigence occurs in a specific context, not any response will do; the rhetor is constrained by the
"beliefs, attitudes, documents, facts, traditions, images, interests, motives" and any other
conditions that exist in the situation that dictate, to the perceptive communicator, what
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should or should not be said. In its entirety, the rhetorical situation, according to Bitzer,
exists in reality as an objective and observable p h e n o m e n o n (like a war) and is, therefore,
"available for scrutiny" by the critic (11). (This theory corresponds quite well with the
"scene-act ratio" of Burke's dramatic pentad in A. Grammar ofMotives. There is a logical
consistency between container and thing contained, between the nature of the acts and the
nature of the scene that contains the acts.)
T h e continual interest in Bitzer's situational theory in both rhetorical and
communications studies is perhaps a result of its simplicity. It is easy to teach, easy to
understand, and deceptively easy to apply to historical events (like the Sixties). However,
there have been critics w h o have concluded for one reason or another that the theory is
either incomplete or dismissive. Starting with K . E . Wilkerson in 1970, many scholars have
added revisions to the theory—in some cases, improving it and rendering it more suitable
for the postmodern discourse of the academy (see Smith and Lybarger 19). Wilkerson's main
objection to Bitzer's theory is with its emphasis on historical circumstances over the
discourse itself and, more importantly, over the rhetor (89). Bitzer seems to believe that
events that evoke rhetorical activity are objective in nature, which ignores the "speaker's
perception of his social context and his preperception (anticipation) of the development of
his communicative act" (92). T o Wilkerson, rhetorical studies should rely m u c h more on the
creative act of the speaker rather than the context in which the message is conveyed.
Richard Vatz has voiced similar criticism of Bitzer's model. Far from being an
objective experience, the rhetorical situation is a fiction, or the "phenomenological
perspective" of those involved, and does n o t exist independent of its participants (154). T h e
exigence, or the thing that is other than it should be, has n o "ethical imperative supposedly
independent of its interpreters," since meaning does n o t reside in events but in symbol-using
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animals who then endow events with meaning (156). In Vatz's thesis, the rhetorical situation
is the culmination of a creative act performed by rhetors who 1) choose the events to
communicate in the first place, and 2) interpret those events for audiences (157). To
paraphrase Marshall McLuhan, the rhetoris the reality: Vatz asserts that power to effect
change rests not in the audience, as Bitzer suggests, but in the interlocutor who has
metaphysical control of how the situation is presented: "Rhetors choose or do not choose to
make salient situations, facts, events, etc. This may be the sine qua non of rhetoric: the art of
linguistically or symbolically creating salience" (160).
Though the top-down episteme Vatz presents may improve Bitzer's rhetorical
situation epistemologically, it seems to give rhetors too much power over both reality and
their audiences. Rhetors cannot make anything exist or cease to exist. If the reality we
understand and depend upon is a fabrication of a speaker's rhetorical creativity, how can we
possibly be led to meaningful action to ameliorate exigence in rhetorical situations?
Considering the question from the other end, Farrell argues that the meaning of rhetorical
experiences depends on the consensus of the audience and the way individuals cooperate to
produce consensus and knowledge independent of how the rhetor understands the situation
(6). Of these two epistemological theories, Farrell's offers a more accurate view of rhetorical
situations and their cooperative nature; however, his assumption that the burden of
knowledge rests solely with the audience is tenuous and not in tandem with contemporary
rhetorical theory.
These are questions of epistemology, and they continue to churn up the discourse
and invite argument about the way participants "know" situations. From its Greek
beginnings, rhetoric has been an uncomfortable bedfellow with philosophy; the dialogue
between the two camps has been, at times, unfriendly. Still, the relationship between
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epistemology and rhetoric has n o t been explored fully nor resolved satisfactorily. T h e recent
debate in the Quarterly Journal of Speech between

Cherwitz/Hikins and Schiappa et al, attests to

the topic's vitality and importance. Any discussion of the realities of the rhetorical situation
is incomplete without some discussion of h o w knowledge is formed through rhetorical
interaction.
According to the Oxford Dictionary of Philosophy, the central questions of epistemology
include "the origin of knowledge; the place of experience in generating knowledge, and the
place of reason in doing so; the relationship between knowledge and certainty . . . the
possibility of universal skepticism; the changing forms of knowledge that arise from new
conceptualizations of the world" (Blackburn 123). Discussions of epistemology over the
centuries have generated two competing metaphors: 1) knowledge is like a pyramid with a
secure, "given" foundation (foundationalism or objectivism); or 2) knowledge is like a
fuselage whose strength is based o n the interlocking parts, with n o foundation (relationism
or relativism) (123). Either knowledge is something that is already established and we need
only find it, or knowledge is something that must be constructed by interlocking parts.
Recendy Jeffery Bineham has referred to the either/or of these two metaphors in rhetorical
theory as the "Cartesian Anxiety" (44).
Both metaphors can be seen operating in rhetorical theory from the beginning. As
early as 5 th century BC the enterprising itinerant teachers, the Sophists, taught young Greek
men that truth and knowledge were discovered through dialectic, persuasion, and a clashing
of arguments (Herrick 38). For them, there was n o foundational truth, n o transcendental
reality with which to connect. There existed, as Protagoras argued, only m e n and words, and
with words the worlds were. In fierce opposition to the Sophists, Plato, through the Socratic
dialogues, taught that there was indeed a truth and a true knowledge, and that reality
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consisted of otherworldly Forms or Ideas beyond the sensible world that could only be
discovered a priori through reason and contemplation. Plato had major disagreements with
the Sophists' epistemological model. In the Gorgias Socrates roundly (as always) defeats the
Sophistic episteme by arguing that rhetoric, or "oratory" as he calls it, "doesn't need to have
any knowledge of the state of their subject matters; it only needs to have discovered some
device to produce persuasion in order to make itself appear to those w h o don't have
knowledge that it knows more than those w h o actually do have it" (459c). T o Socrates, the
entire rhetorical enterprise is suspiciously similar to base flattery, wherein rhetors say only
"what's pleasant with n o consideration for what's best" (465a). Taken epistemologically, the
Sophistic rhetorical tradition, to Plato, could be likened to a boat crew lost at sea w h o decide
to vote which way is north. A vote does not decide it. True north is in only one direction,
regardless of the efforts of the sailors to define it with their perception. Furthermore, the
reality of things could be found freely by those willing give their lives to contemplation and
reflection of the true Forms behind and above the world, as Socrates had.
Later, Aristode bridged the epistemological rift between philosophy and rhetoric by
postulating that Plato's Forms were not in an invisible, unattainable realm, but in the here
and now, in the particulars of daily existence. In terms of epistemology, Aristode believed in
a posteriori knowledge, or experiential knowledge based on data collected by the senses. T o
know something is to know it through the body. Furthermore, to know something is to
know what it is in relation to other things rather than its relation to a more perfect
transcendental Form. Knowledge is order, it is particular, it is class and genus and species,
and truly persuasive rhetoric seeks to define things as what they are, in relation to what they
are not (Hamlyn 13). It is the work of the rhetor to bring such definitions to light. Rhetoric
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is merely a tool, a techne, for this process; it is amoral, in spite of Plato's arguments. It can be
used for both good and evil purposes depending on the virtue of the rhetor.
From Aristotle to the present, rhetorical theorists (including Cicero, Locke,
Campbell, and others) have perpetuated the same epistemological bias I see in Vatz—
specifically, that it is the rhetor and not the audience that creates meaning through rhetorical
discourse in rhetorical situations. However misplaced, the idea continues that knowledge
created in situations is the work of rhetors who invent their message, craft it in a way that
will persuade, and deliver it in a way that is pleasing. As we have seen, there are obviously
shortcomings in Bitzer's rhetorical situation, but a theory that embraces a rhetor-heavy
epistemology is incomplete, especially when considering postmodern rhetorical discourse
and the prevalence of intersubjectivity, social construction, and social-epistemic theories of
knowledge.
Strictly speaking, the revisionists' main objection to Bitzer's situational theory was its
objectivist perspective—a perspective that lost its luster early in the twentieth century after
the work of iconoclasts of the transcendental like Nietzsche and Heiddegger, and later by
antifoundationalists like Lacan, Foucault, Derrida, and Rorty. Theorists began to see
knowledge as something contingent, contextual, free-floating, constructed and dependent on
time, place, people and even situation (which creates a subtle irony with Bitzer). Bitzer's
claim that the situation "exists as a real thing apart from human perception, recognition, or
interaction" has been dismissed, as we have seen (Jasinski "Rhetorical Situation" 696). It is
not that contemporary scholars are solipsists: Things happen, out there in the real world,
apart from the mind. Yet our understanding of objects or events (and the symbols we use to
represent them) gives them meaning. It is the constraint of perception in individuals—both
speaking and receiving—that ultimately makes meaning in rhetorical situations. "The
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existence of a document," explains Patton, "will probably be less constraining than what is
believed about the document" (45).
Anticipating this epistemological dilemma in rhetorical theory, Robert Scott in 1967
wrote the groundbreaking essay "On Viewing Rhetoric as Epistemic" that coined the
rhetorical term, "epistemic rhetoric." Sophistically, Scott argued that "man must consider
truth not as something fixed and final but as something to be created moment by moment in
the circumstances in which he finds himself and with which he must cope" (17). In that
sense, then, rhetoric "is a way of knowing; it is epistemic" (17). A.priori knowledge and
transcendental or fixed truth, hand-me-downs from Plato, were not useful concepts
anymore. Human beings must use symbols to communicate and make sense of their world,
and therefore the purposeful attempt to create meaning through symbols is both rhetorical
and epistemic. Our use of symbols creates the meaning. Ten years later, Scott still preached
this doctrine. If societies are to apply what they know to make life better, then
rhetoric as a means of understanding social reality as well as a means of acting effectively
within a community is assured. . . . [Rhetoric can be seen] as a human potentiality to
understand the human condition. ("On Viewing Rhetoric as Epistemic: Ten Years Later"
266)
With these thoughts, Scott seemingly reversed rhetoric's status as the handmaiden
for truth and knowledge or the decorator of discourse and argued effectively that rhetoric
was truth, made truth, constructed truth (Jasinski 221).
Scott's work continued through the work of one of his students, Barry Brummett,
who in a 1976 essay for Philosophy andRhetoricma.de the connection between the
indeterminacy and chaos of quantum mechanics (as opposed to the objective determinacy of
Newtonian physics) and epistemic rhetoric. Relying on the process theory of Kuhn,
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Brummett uses the w o r d "intersubjectivity" to explain the p h e n o m e n o n that "what and how
people know is nothing more or less than the study of the nature of reality" (28). In other
words, we can't know what we do n o t know. Reality is w o u n d up in our experience with it,
but we do not make up reality: we participate in making reality (28). Rhetoric, essentially, is a
purposeful construction of reality through symbols, and moreover it is essentially a social
construction via communication that creates meaning: "only if reality is shared, that is to say
created by discourse, can it be changed or altered by discourse" (31). This is n o t to say that
everyone will have the same understanding of reality and situations. Hardly. But through the
sharing of discourse and, as Brummett aptly puts it, "verification of experience" through
symbolic exchange processes, communities (such as the scientific) can come to a consensus
on certain issues and truths (33). Consensus becomes reality for the group. Consensus allows
participants in rhetorical situations to respond to exigences and to change conditions in
which they live—the crowning achievement of rhetoric.
At a symposium at Purdue, ten years after " T h e Rhetorical Situation," Bitzer himself
conceded that there are such things as personal facts contingent o n an individual's "personal
subjectivity," though he still maintained that there were truths which exist independent of
human participation ("Rhetoric and Public Knowledge" 84). In this address it seems Bitzer
rethought the objective nature of his situational theory (if, in fact, he had meant to be
completely objectivist in the first place):
T h e public, as a collective body or community of persons sharing inherited elements
of mental life, gives existence to personal or subjective facts in the same way as the
individual. Purely factual conditions experienced by the public come into relation
with shared sentiments, principles, and values that characterize persons n o t as
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individuals but as members of the public; and the power of participation transforms
those factual conditions into the public's personal facts. (85)
So like Brummett, Bitzer recognizes that (at least) some facts are socially contingent and, as
in Kuhn's thesis, exist only as long as the community sustains them. Both Bitzer's (at least in
the Purdue address) and Brummett's comments about meaning can be classified as social
constructivist. Operating on the concept of social-epistemic, social constructivists take the
middle ground between hard-line objectivism and individual relativism. The meanings of
exigences in rhetorical situations are created through discourse within a community (Jasinski
221). Therefore, meaning in rhetorical situations is co-creative; in the words of James Berlin,
the nature of reality is determined by "dialectical interaction of the observer, the discourse
community in which the observer is functioning, and the material conditions of existence"
(488). Or, as Trimbur explains, social constructivists argue that groups "draw upon the
linguistic resources available within particular cultures and specialized social milieux in order
to constitute reality and to position themselves as speakers, writers, and actors in relation to
these locally constituted realities, to each other, and to social institutions" (675).
However epistemologically sound social constructivists can be, there is still a sense
that they are on that storm-tossed boat voting which way is true north. Critics of social
constructivism have pointed out that the meaning we attach to an object does not change its
ontological state (Jasinski 222). Put bluntly, all the "locally constituted realities" in the world
will not make it possible to walk through a wall or turn north into east. Yet this seems a
rather juvenile rebuttal, since no reasonable community will attempt to defy the laws of time,
space, or physics with discourse. Rather, for social constructivists the purpose of rhetoric is
to get things done in the world, together. When exigences emerge and threaten the stasis of
community life, the most constructive and pragmatic way to approach the problem is
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consensus and agreement. A n d b o t h those conditions depend on the way the community
understands the rhetorical situation as a collective body.
T o sum up this discussion of Bitzer, I believe it is clear that his situational theory
made an excellent and lasting contribution to the study of rhetoric; and, with a few
modifications, it will continue to illuminate rhetorical discourse, particularly discursive
practices in historical contexts. However, from its first appearance in 1968, the metaphysical
and epistemological aspects of situational theory were underdeveloped and needed revision.
W e learn from the critics of Bitzer that clearly there can be n o complete discussion of
situational or contextual theory that does n o t consider the roles of rhetors and audiences in
constructing the realities of the situation or context. Bitzer's main error was in placing too
much emphasis on the objective, environmental phenomena that make up the situation and
stimulate the players to respond with discourse. Furthermore, the "players" themselves are
not the most reliable communicators of what is real, but are made up of multiple,
fragmented "selves" that must then communicate through the imperfect symbol-system we
call language. Therefore, there is little use in explaining a rhetorical situation from an event
perspective without recognizing the perceptions, biases, recognitions, purposes,
understandings—basically, the mortal and flawed souls—of both those w h o create discourse
and those w h o hear and respond to it. It is the practice of discerning the souls of situations,
I suggest, that is the actual sina qua non of rhetoric.
Ironically, then, we are back to what Bitzer calls "constraints." For if rhetorical
discourse is best understood by examining the souls of those involved in the situation rather
than the situation itself, then any attempt to apply rhetorical theory must take into account
who is involved, rather than what. A n d that brings us to questions of identity in rhetorical
discourse.
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Whether they knew it or not, Bitzer's critics recognized the importance of identity in
rhetorical theory. Much of their criticism, as has been shown, has much to do with the
perception and purpose of the rhetor as an individual, or with the way the world view of the
audience interacts with the world view of the interlocutors. W h a t is said in certain situations
can be explained m o r e lucidly by recognizing a shared identity or the working rhetorical
identity of those involved. Without this awareness, situational theory is incomplete—all the
scholars w h o revise situational theory, from Wilkerson to Smith and Lybarger, attest to this,
whether explicitly or implicitly. T h e souls of the situation make the situation.
W e must then turn to Kenneth Burke and the principle of identification to complete
Bitzer, or at least make his theory more tenable to postmodern criticism and the
understanding of social construction. Burke, the brilliant twentieth-century language theorist,
spent his long academic career searching for the ultimate theory to explain why humans do
what they do. In his early work Permanence and Change, he argues that the power of
communication depends on whether the rhetor and the auditor have a shared world view or
orientation. A person's orientation becomes clear in certain situations "marked by conflict,"
and certain motives are manifest by reaction to the stimuli the situation creates (30). Burke
treats motive and situation as synonymous terms (31). From a rhetorical perspective, this
means that rhetors, if they wish to encourage action in a rhetorical situation, must cater the
message to the orientation of the auditors. In other words, they must identify with their
audience.
These concepts of orientation and situation correspond quite well to Bitzer's
situational theory, though it seems n o scholar (not even Benoit) has discussed the apparent
connection. Furthermore, in Permanence and Change Burke can even be read to address the
metaphysical discussion of the Bitzerean revisionists, particularly Benoit w h o pointed out the
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stimulus-response weakness of the theory. Burke, too, uses the word stimulus for rhetorical
situations, though he did not think stimuli had absolute meanings (PC 35). Rather, Burke
favors the contingent, interpretive social-epistemic concept of reality in rhetorical situations:
Any given situation derives its character from the entire framework of interpretation
by which we judge it. A n d differences in our ways of sizing up an objective situation
are expressed subjectively as differences in our assignment of motive. . . . W e discern
situational patterns by means of the particular vocabulary' of the cultural group into
which we are born. . . . These relationships are not realities, they are interpretations of
reality—hence different frameworks of interpretation will lead to different
conclusions as to what reality is. (PC 35)
T h e only way, then, to effectively deal with reality (or the appearance of it) is to cooperate
with others in symbolic exchanges, such as through metaphors, analogies, simplifications,
etc. It is important to note that however "unreal" reality is, or how inaccessible due to
various interpretations and slippery symbols, Burke believed that cooperation through
symbols is a literal (as opposed to metaphorical) process that gets tangible things done in the
real world ("Dramatism" 448). Permanence and Change concludes that "a system of ideal
cooperation . . . would be a m o m e n t o u s material aid to the communicative m e d i u m " (xlix).
In later works, Burke revised his theory of symbolic cooperation in rhetorical
situations to better reflect the identities of the participants. Fifteen years after Permanence and
Change he had been led to believe that perhaps persuasion should be replaced by the word
identification, a term "of wider scope," in definitions of rhetoric (RM 20). In the Journal of
General Education he made this shift explicit:
If I had to sum up in one word the difference between the "old" rhetoric anda
" n e w " . . . I would reduce it to this: T h e key term for the old rhetoric was
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"persuasion" and its stress was upon deliberate design. The key term for the "new"
rhetoric would be "identification," which can include a partially "unconscious" factor
of appeal. ("Rhetoric—Old and New" 203)
In A Rhetoric ofMotives he concluded that "we must think of rhetoric not in terms of some
one particular address, but as a general body of identifications" which he took to mean
commonly shared principles between or among bodies (26). Moving beyond Aristode's
teaching that the character of the speaker is the "controlling factor in persuasion" (38),
Burke suggests that ethos must be a principle of commonality, not just a description of the
speaker: "You persuade a man only insofar as you can talk his language by speech, gesture,
tonality, order, image, attitude, idea, identifying your ways with his" (RM 55). I believe Burke is
suggesting that we may substitute identification for ethos, for a rhetor has a persuasive
character only as he or she demonstrates a character the audience not only appreciates but
can identify with. "Only those voices from without are effective," argued Burke, "which can
speak in the language of a voice within" (RM 39). (I will discuss ethos as identification
further in the next chapter.)
In rhetorical situations, the players have "common sensations, concepts, images,
ideas, attitudes, that make them consubstantiaP (21). This consubstantiality creates a common
ground in the rhetorical field, and "common ground makes for transformability" or change
{Grammar ofMotives xix). Using a crafty metaphor based on alchemy, Burke theorizes that
even seemingly opposing terms (and, it could be added, seemingly opposing identities) come
from the same "central moltenness" and share a similar substance that should be used to
more perfecdy communicate (GM xix). One of Burke's interpreters has suggested that the
struggle for identification is, for Burke, "the universal situation" and the only way to live and
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communicate "purposefully" (Rueckert 43-45). Also it can be seen as one of the most
effective and creative epistemes in rhetorical situations.
Recent scholarship suggests that Burke never intended identification to replace
Aristode's persuasion, but rather understood "the act of discovering or creating the probable
shared grounds or joined interests" as what makes persuasion possible in the first place
(Youngdahl and Warnock 337). However, it has been said that identification, though clearly
used for purposes of persuasion, is "less adversarial, less coercive, less individualistic, more
collaborative, more mystical, and more feminist" than persuasion; also, it generally promises
more "unity, cooperation, community, dialogue, equality" and peace (337). Furthermore,
Jasinski and others suggest that identification can be "unconscious or preconscious," making
it an act of non-intentionality (306). (Whether or not an act of "non-intentionality" can be
rhetorical in the purest sense is open for argument.)
In conclusion, I would like to propose that Kenneth Burke's identification theory is
the governing constraint of Lloyd Bitzer's modified situational theory and the key to
understanding epistemology in rhetorical situations. Quite simply, the rhetorical process of
identification, whether intentional or not, creates a bridge between the rhetor and the
audience, thus making a somewhat unified, analyzable entity—a communal ethos—from
which many assumptions about motive and action can be made. As Burke has said, we can
understand much of the reasons and motives behind others' discursive practices and actions
if we understand something of their orientations; and if we can detect consubstantiation
between the rhetors and auditors we can know, to some degree, why groups say what they
say and do what they do. Identification theory works particularly well in studying the
discourse of voluntary associations like schools and businesses where there is a feeling of
shared interests and goals—sometimes established long before crisis hits. In such instances,
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identification can be said to be a collaborative process, or something that all (or most) of the
participants want.
Having introduced Burke's identification theory as the answer to the epistemological
debate in situational theory, I can now move from theory to practice, from ideas to history.
In the next chapter I will discuss how a very simple speech addressed to the student body of
Brigham Young University revealed an implicit process of identification and reflected the
way BYU students and faculty thought and acted about the rhetorical situation of Sixties
protest.
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CHAPTER TWO
Dress, Grooming and Communal Ethos: Spiro Agnew Addresses BYU
I argue that the epistemological turn from the arguments of the rhetor to the
identification of rhetor and audience, as I have discussed it in the last chapter, demands a
more thorough discussion of ethos in rhetorical situations. As discussed in the introduction,
the uniqueness of Brigham Young University's discursive practices during the mercurial
rhetorical situation of the Sixties is best understood using Burkean identification—
specifically, in discussing BYU's almost unanimous identification with conservative leadership
(embodied in the Nixon administration) and against student protest (embodied in SDS).
During the Sixties, President Wilkinson and his adrninistration cooperated rhetorically with
the student body to create the calm, conservative atmosphere that captured media attention
and established BYU as an "oasis of peace" amidst academic anarchy, as Wilkinson's
biographers noted (Deem and Bird 418). When interviewed about why there were no
demonstrations or sit-ins or the like at BYU, Wilkinson said that the students there had been
raised to be obedient, were more mature than other students, and recognized that attending
the highly selective, church-sponsored school was an honor and a privilege, not a right
(Deem and Bird 421-422). However true those three points may be, I suggest that they are
not adequate for understanding the complete rhetorical forces at work. Let us look at one
speech that was given at BYU during the height of the Vietnam Conflict that, to me, makes
clear how identification and identity worked in BYU discourse and affected opinion and
action.
In a forum address on 8 May 1969 Spiro T. Agnew, then vice-president to Richard
Nixon, spoke to students of Brigham Young University about the nation-wide campus
unrest. As part of the Nixon adrninistration, Agnew had adopted a "no tolerance" policy

toward the counterculture offspring of the social protest movement. A good portion of the
popularity of the Nixon administration depended on moderate America's distaste of the
hippies, yippies, and weathermen—the brazen minority that always caught television air
time. As mentioned before, the agitation against the war did not achieve its rhetorical goals
of turning America against the war, but had certainly turned America against the antiwar
movement. Gustainis and Hahn have pinpointed the rhetorical weakness of the movement:
it seems clear that the manifestation of counter-culture values by anti-war protestors
(through dress, grooming, slogans, public nudity, and drug use, among other things)
was a rhetorical error. The target audience for the antiwar protest, citizens of Middle
America, found the counter-culture protesters distasteful, even threatening. (206)
Nixon and Agnew sought to capitalize on this souring public opinion. Agnew's BYU forum
speech is an excellent example of that capitalization and illustrates the power of rhetorical
identification as an inroad to rhetorical action.
Even at BYU, traditionally a strongly conservative institution after World War II,
"the debate on campus over the merits of the Vietnam War passed from the exchange of
ideas to more militant activism," even though that activism was barely noticeable (Bergera
and Priddis 183). The stakes were high; the efficacy of words and protest ultimately became
a matter of life and death to male students whose draft numbers were low enough. Yet in
spite of the cross-country college protests, the capture of school buildings by student
radicals, the sit-ins and die-ins and demonstrations and boycotts, BYU remained an "island
of tranquility" and a bastion for conservative thought and patriotism. There is evidence in
Spiro Agnew's speech that he understood clearly BYU's identity as a conservative institution
that consciously defined itself through policy and through the currents of Mormon worldview and cultural. Whether intentionally or not, the Vice President capitalized on BYU's
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identity by crafting his speech as an epideictic, or a celebration of the conservative culture and
a condemnation of the radical student movements. The power of his speech to perpetuate
obedience to the government and adherence to patriotic civility lies not in an argument or a
call to action, but in overt evocation and praise of a shared ethos—a shared character or
identity.
Again, it is Kenneth Burke who has given us the language to recognize the rhetorical
experience a speaker like Agnew creates when he or she invites, through epideictic, a firm
recommitment to group culture and standards. In Burke's vocabulary, when the rhetor
identifies himself with his audience by speaking "in terms of some principle they share in
common," then there is an act of consubstantiality or a solidifying of "common sensations,
concepts, images, ideas, [and] attitudes" (Rhetoric ofMotives 21). In AttitudesToward'History
Burke explains further that the idea of the autonomous "individual" is patently false, and
that "identity is not individual, that a man 'identifies himself with all sorts of manifestations
beyond himself (263). The act of identification, it turns out, is healthy and necessary and
must exist in an environment where social goals require cooperation: "The so-called T is
merely a unique combination of partially conflicting 'corporate we's'" (264). Through our
actions and speech we identify with business, corporations, families, institutions and the
government; we wed our motives with theirs and share, through the concept of
consubstantiality, a common substance.
Burke's identification theory is particularly useful when we discuss epideictic
speeches, whose end-goal is not only to praise and blame, but to reinforce fundamental
cultural values shared by the rhetorical community. Gerard Hauser has explained that in the
Greek world,
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the occasion for praising or blaming significant public acts and actors also afforded
the opportunity to address fundamental values and beliefs that made collective
political action within the democracy more than a theoretical possibility. (5)
In other words, epideictic (even for the Greeks) was not merely a ceremonial exercise meant
to entertain an audience at a funeral or after a battle. In the praising of the hero or the
condemning of the coward, the encomiast communicates "matters of mutual interest,"
identifying both speaker and auditor as a public, and creating a "viable public sphere in
which a people may engage in politics" (18). Far beyond saying, this is what we are, the
epideictic says emphatically, this is what we do. Hauser makes it clear that social action in a
defined public cannot take place without "first recognizing shared bonds of community that
transcend individual differences" (19). This is exactly what Burke means when he talks of
consubstantiality and identification.
Though we have recognized that epideictic encourages, however indirecdy, social
action, it is important to add that epideictic is not necessarily concerned with what so
preoccupied Wayne Booth in Modern Dogma and the Rhetoric of Assent, namely changing minds
and opinions (12). In the epideictic genre, the encomiast assumes that there is automatically
some agreement, some shared opinions, that need only be brought to light eloquently.
Therefore, the process of identification, as Burke has said, is less about persuasion and more
about the unity of souls. According to Dale Sullivan, epideictic is a lot like preaching to the
choir. "In the final analysis," he writes, "it is only believers who experience epideictic rhetoric
in its traditional sense, an observation that leads to a redefinition of epideictic rhetoric based
on audience reaction" (Sullivan 128, my emphasis). The auditors find themselves
participating in a "celebration of their vision of reality," hosted by the encomiast (128).
Though "preaching to the choir" in a connotative sense suggests that the sermon falls on
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deaf or saturated ears, in an epideictic speech the audience actively participates by
reaffirming its faith in the status quo culture the encomiast celebrates. Therefore, epideictic
serves as a tool of orthodoxy—it lauds and preserves the right (orthos) opinion (doxa) of
reality already adhered to by the speaker and the spoken-to. For Sullivan, the encomiast
assumes the auditors are "already within the pale and attempts to increase the intensity of their
adherence to those values held in c o m m o n " (126, my emphasis). As was seen in the last
chapter, the group orientation or consubstantiation creates knowledge and meaning in
rhetorical situations.
Ethos, then, is n o t as we commonly understand it when speaking of the rhetorical
situation. W e are used to speaking of ethos as we have been trained to by Aristotle, as the
qualities that make a speaker "worthy of credence" (1.2.4). Or, in the case of epideictic,
ethos can refer to the character of those praised, w h o in Aristotle's Rhetoric are deliberate
doers of selfless acts (1.9.19). Sullivan explains that though these two understandings of
epideictic are valid, they are insufficient to understanding the full efficacy of an epideictic
speech to evoke identification:
Ethos is n o t primarily an attribute of the speaker, nor even an audience perception:
It is, instead, the c o m m o n dwelling place of both, the timeless, consubstantial space
that enfolds participants in epideictic exchange. Things that are consubstantial share
substance, and, if in some metaphysical sense, we can say that those w h o share a
c o m m o n mental or spiritual space also share a c o m m o n substance, we begin to
experience ethos as consubstantiality. (127)
W e are talking here of group ethos, or the character and identity of b o t h the encomiast and
the audience—the character that the encomiast lights up in neon in the speech. T h e
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c o m m o n identity is re-evoked and reinforced, and through that channel social action is
possible (though, once again, not explicidy advocated by the speaker).
N o w , having established the role of identification, ethos, and social action in
epideictic, we return to Spiro Agnew's speech at the BYU forum to glean from it a rhetorical
tool that might have been only latent in Agnew's or the students' minds.
A t the time Agnew gave this speech, the country was seething in contention over the
ethics of the Vietnam Conflict. After 1967, when the war showed n o signs of slowing or
ending, the antiwar m o v e m e n t against Vietnam became, in the words of one historian, "the
most successful antiwar movement in the history of the world" (Gitlin 293fn). College
campuses across the nation bubbled with the rhetorical, ranging from the well-reasoned
p r o / c o n essay from the faculty to the highly symbolic "die-in," with students in black
clothes with white faces. As was noted in the introduction, campus unrest became epidemic;
students in a few prominent universities took militant action against an academic machine
they believed perpetuated the power structure that made the Vietnam war so damning. In
late 1969, the year of Agnew's speech to BYU, 69 per cent of college students labeled
themselves doves (Gitlin 409).
But Agnew was approaching an entirely different crowd, and he knew it. Earlier that
year, both the Chicago Tribune and US News and World Keport had written about the "island of
tranquility" in the sea of academic turbulence. During his vasdy influential tenure, Ernest
Wilkinson, president of BYU from 1 9 5 1 - 1 9 7 1 , had "actively promoted a politically
conservative image b o t h for himself and his university," which had changed nearly fifty years
of political neutrality at the school (Bergera and Priddis 193). While other campuses
protested, BYU students inaugurated America Week and Military Week to show their
support for the war. In 1968, over 75 per cent of BYU students did n o t think the war was
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immoral (Larsen and Schwendiman 157). In a rhetorical sense, Spiro Agnew, the ferociously
right-wing ex-governor of Maryland, had come to preach to the choir.
His sermon is quite telling of the kind of conservative culture Agnew believed he
shared with Brigham Young University. In the very first minute of the speech, Agnew
presented himself as an encomiast, overdy praising a particular shared culture—a communal
ethos or consubstantial substance—and mocking a particular aberrant culture. After opening
with a lame joke about the superfluity of the vice presidency, Agnew jumped right into his
epideictic:
For me the Brigham Y o u n g campus offers a refreshing change of pace. Its virtues
are readily apparent. Here the scenery is magnificent, the buildings are handsome,
and you can still tell the boys from the girls. N o w don't misunderstand me, I don't
have anything against long hair, but I didn't raise my son to be my daughter. (433)
W h e n we consider the true focus of this speech and the identity Agnew wishes to evoke, the
compliments about the physical aspects of the campus seem to be merely cadence for the
punch-line, which turns out to be a reflection of the communal ethos. Beginning in 1965
(coincidentally, the year of Operation Rolling T h u n d e r and the first American offensives in
the Vietnam conflict), Wilkinson began to take great pains to object to the lax grooming
standards of the student body, which resulted in new campus legislation focused on
annihilating any personal appearances that were aberrations of the conservative and clean
norm.
I may point out here that personal appearance, dress and adornment are rhetorical by
nature. T h e social psychology of clothing, which has descended to the present from
philosophers like George Herbert Mead, shows clearly a situational nature according to
Susan Kaiser, w h o explains that people construct their outward identities "in relation to the
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intentions of other communicators and to the nature of society" (15). Clothing symbols and
standards have little meaning outside situational contexts like work places or religious
sanctuaries (139). In these situational settings, identities are negotiated through feedback,
interactions and perceptions in a rhetorical symbolic exchange (197).
So the way we look has much to do with the way we identify with others in contextbased rhetorical settings. This is why we do not show up to funerals wearing baby-blue
tuxedos or Bermuda shorts. Furthermore, clothing is more than situational—clothes can
connote social organization and belonging, as with group uniforms such as sports teams or
restaurant staffs. Uniforms permit organizations to define with precision their membership
and, the corollary, aberrations from the group identity (Joseph 3). This is what Burke means
when he explains that implied in every instance of identification is the concept of division or
exclusion (RM 22). If you wear X jersey, you are on X team and, automatically, you identify
against teams Y and Z. In this way, the uniform symbolizes "uniformity" and identification
with a common cause or project against all others.
The clothing context in which Spiro Agnew addressed BYU was one, you could say,
of hyperidentification and division. When the War and the protest movement intensified
simultaneously, the Vietnam Generation's attempts to identify with or against through
clothing intensified as well. The sons and daughters of the counterculture, particularly, sent
out blatant rhetorical messages with their deviations from acceptable clothing styles. In her
recent work Dress Codes, Rubinstein explains the messages inherent in hippie dress:
"Rejecting the Vietnam War and the draft, hippies adopted an appearance and clothing that
reflected their 'revolution' against rationality, self-restraint, and goal directed behavior, the
values underlining institutional discourse" (220). In contrast to the suit-and-tie niceties of
suburban office workers, "they looked disheveled and unkempt. They wore their hair long,
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and jeans and work shirts became their 'uniform'"(220). Implied in the messages of hippie
clothing was hippie morality: Since the politicians w h o perpetuated the war wore suits and
ties, and since the affluent society had turned to nuclear and consumer madness, we will
identify against the suits by looking like bums. (Jack Kerouac may be responsible for giving
birth to this sensibility through his "darma b u m s " and "holy goofs.") W e have seen h o w the
dress and behavior of the counterculture led to its total rhetorical alienation from the
moderate majority.
Agnew understood this division clearly, as did the administration he represented.
"Today, our colleges are under siege," he explained to the BYU student body. T h e "small
minority" of vigilantes, lawless demonstrators and long-haired delinquents stood in stark
contrast against "a vast faceless majority of the American public" w h o sat in "quiet fury"
over the situation (434). Later that fall, Nixon was to give his historic speech in which he
consolidated his constituency into one great group he called "the silent majority." As
Nixon's right arm, Agnew perpetuated the silent majority doctrine through what King and
Anderson have called a "rhetoric of polarization," defined as "the process by which an
extremely diversified public is coalesced into two or more highly contrasting, mutually
exclusive groups sharing a high degree of internal solidarity in those beliefs which the
persuader considers salient" (178). In order to create an environment of polarization, a
rhetor must create a feeling of group solidarity against a perceived " c o m m o n foe" which
stands in opposition to the identity and values of the group. Agnew, like all rhetors of
polarity, sought to undermine the group ethos of his competitors, the counterculture (178).
For certain, Agnew had an ally in Ernest Wilkinson. In response to the countercultural changes in dress in the mid-1960s, Ernest Wilkinson began to make clear that BYU
and its students did not identify with the counterculture, even in the least. During his
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administration, the BYU honor code transmogrified from a code about plagiarism and
cheating to a code of public self-hood. Much of Wilkinson's public discourse reveals quite an
anxiety on this matter. In his welcome address in September 1965, tided "Make Honor Your
Standard," Wilkinson reminded the student body of their commitments to keep LDS
standards in conduct and dress."We do expect the boys to have civilized attire," he
explained, "and we expect the girls to be modest and becoming in their dress." Making an
explicit allusion to the emergence of counterculture dress in men he said, "we do not want
on our campus any beades, beatniks, or buzzards!" (9). To clear up any confusion there
might have been about the definitions of beades, beatniks or buzzards, Wilkinson summed
up his attitude of the counterculture:
Certain kinds of people who seemed to be odd balls and had no regard for the
culture or responsibilities of a civilized people were first characterized as
'deadbeats' and are now referred to as 'beatniks.' There is no place at BYU for the
grimy, sandaled, tight-fitted, ragged-levi beatnik. If any appear on our campus we
intend to 'tick them off.' (10)
As for the girls, Wilkinson concluded that "we want no 'go-go girls' nor their pseudosophisticated friends, nor will we tolerate any 'surfers'" (10).
What he meant by these strange titles is less important than what identity he wanted
to solidify in the minds of the students. In a later speech, Wilkinson told the students that
visitors frequendy commended the "clean appearance" of the students—clean cut, modesdy
dressed—when compared to campuses elsewhere ("Welcome Address Sept 1967 p. 12). In
the fall of 1968, he wrote to parents of incoming freshmen that they should be clean cut and
clean shaven and, thereby, would resist "the emulation of undesirable contemporary
characters" (Bergera and Priddis 108—9). The clean look, then, became a double-
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identification: identifying with the conservative, war-supporting BYU character, and
identifying against the "freak flags" of the insubordinate, "undesirable," campus hippie
element.
Wilkinson's successor, Dallin H. Oaks, continued the administrative war against any
form of dress identification with the counter-culture. In 1971 Oaks took more than half of
his welcome speech to explain the dress code. Unlike Wilkinson, Oaks seemed to understand
the historic context of the dress code and explained that the rules against beards and long
hair were "contemporary and pragmatic" ("Welcome Speech" 12), meaning that there was
nothing inherendy w r o n g with beards and long hair—but "at this particular point in time"
they represented far m o r e than careless grooming habits:
In the minds of most people at this time, the beard and long hair are associated with
protest, revolution, and rebellion against authority. They are also symbols of the
hippie and drug culture. Persons w h o wear beards or long hair, whether they desire
it or not, may identify themselves with or emulate and h o n o r the drug culture or the
extreme practices of those w h o have made slovenly appearance a badge of protest
and dissent. (13, my emphasis)
Apparent to Oaks was the dangerous rhetorical game of identification; the symbolic message
sent out by long hair linked the wearer with the counterculture and the rebellious ideology
espoused by protestors and dissenters.
Identifying by n o t identifying with, as we have seen, is a Burkean concept which he
calls "identification by antithesis" ("Responsibilities of National Greatness" 50). Both
Agnew and Wilkinson recognized a c o m m o n enemy to communal orthodoxy, and in
Agnew's words the enemy was "long on locks and lean on faith" (433). By antithetical
identification, the corporate "we"Agnew wishes to re-evoke is b o t h trimmed and true—not a
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"strident majority," but a conservative, private school that "does honor to the public spirit"
(433). Whether or not Agnew intended it so, setting up a bad guy to use as foil for
communal ethos is a practice as ancient as epideictic and serves, ultimately, to remind the
auditors of "the aesthetic vision of orthodox values" (Sullivan 118), in this case by ridiculing
the sexually indistinguishable unorthodox. By further discussing the delinquent and
disruptive behavior of "self-appointed vigilantes," Agnew seems to heighten the antithetical
identification, saying this is what we don't do (extra emphasis on the we).
Any discussion of ethos in epideictic rhetoric must take into account a community,
rather than an individual (like the rhetor or the hero he or she lauds). W h e n the encomiast
praises the noble works of heroes of the culture, it is, in Hauser's words, "a manifestation of
their [the rhetor's and the auditors'] communal aspirations" (15). The lauded acts of the hero
are "exemplary of a larger commitment" of the orthodox community "to ethical b o n d s and
moral rectitude" (16). This makes the epideictic a group effort, even though one m a n or one
act may take the spotlight. In this way, Hauser explains, communities can act together in the
public realm through "collective political action" (5).
So w h o is the lauded hero in Agnew's epideictic tale of communal ethos? It is the
collective body of Brigham Young University. In this instance, the audience itself is the hero
the encomiast praises. If we can borrow Hauser's thoughts for a moment, the speech can be
explicated thus:
T h e lauded hero's [BYU] life is exemplary of a larger commitment to ethical bonds
and moral rectitude [the silent majority, the Republican party, the conservative
orthodoxy] . . . T o follow the story and, m o r e importandy, to testify to its truth
requires the ability to grasp it as a statement of communal e t h o s ; . . . They [the points
of reference for praise or blame] illustrate h o w we may offer the city [or campus]
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images of civic virtue through comparison with traits of known actors [BYU
students] and rival ways of life [long on locks, dissenting minority, Berkeley]. (16)
It is obvious now that Agnew was not seeking to change anyone's mind. He was not there to
trump up support for or cosmetically improve a war that had gone sour in the public mind.
He was there to remind BYU students of who they were and what they shared with the
powers that be. So Wilkinson was concerned with the tendency of students to wear long hair
and protest wars; that tendency concerned Agnew and the conservative leadership as well.
So BYU felt it must identify itself with those locked in armed struggle against evil forces;
Agnew shared that conviction. In his speech to the student body of Brigham Young
University in 1969, Spiro Agnew sought to bring to light these consubstantial traits, morals,
and values and recommit the students to imitate them.
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CHAPTER T H R E E
Questions of Power: Wilkinson and Group Identity
We have seen how a university president can practically legislate identity through
dress and grooming standards in order to present communal ethos. This fact may beg the
question, Where does an administrator like Wilkinson get his rhetorical power and why,
evidently, do students cooperate with this exercise of power?
It is probably not well known that much of campus protest in the early Sixties had
little to do with Vietnam and everything to do with rhetorical power, or the power to make
language work for special interests in the campus community (see Howe 389). The Berkeley
Free Speech Movement in 1964 was basically a response to authority's attempt to silence
radical political discourse at the university. In campus exchange, as in most rhetorical
situations in American life, there is a balance of power, or rather an imbalance of power,
since one body will always have more control over the outcome of communicative exchange
than the other, due to the hierarchical nature of organizations like universities. This
imbalance of power, I believe, is the most important factor or constraint in the rhetorical
situation we are addressing here, and one of the most fascinating reasons why students at
Brigham Young University did not protest to the degree other students did. Not only did
they foster a strong respect and fear of authority, but they did not even have the opportunity
to fully identify with the New Left or any non-conservative ideology, as other student bodies
had. In the case of BYU in the Sixties, Ernest Wilkinson, the school's president, exercised
great power over the discourse through defining administratively the limits of BYU
identification and silencing any attempt to present an opposite view. However, since Burke's
identification can be seen as a collaborative effort—the student receiving "indoctrination"
from without and completing the process willingly "from within" (RM 39), thus emphasizing
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the sociality of rhetorical identity (Cheney 144)—and considering Foucault's theory that
power is never concentrated in one body, then we can view the measures taken by Wilkinson
to control die discourse on campus as a collaborative work in communal identification.
T h e epistemological and metaphysical shortcomings of Bitzer's situational theory
have been reviewed here, b u t there has been n o mention of order, hierarchy, and structure as
constraints that shape identifying discourse. Asante and Atwater were the first scholars to
suggest that Bitzer's attention to context seemed to overlook "the inherent structural
constraints" that come in rhetorical situations (171). Structure, they argue, "becomes a form
of discourse apart from its character in the words of a discourse," or in other words, the
existing hierarchy of power and position represented in individuals in a situation is rhetorical
in itself (171). Even such abstract practices such as literary criticism have inherent in their
structures the idea, at least, that someone knows more or is in a more enlightened position
than someone else, implying b o t h authority, power, and place (174). This new revision of
situational theory implies questions of power and authority in rhetorical situations, and
invites further discussion of h o w power affects the way participants respond to exigences.
In his discussion of order in A. Rhetoric ofMotives, Kenneth Burke explains the difference
between "dialectical" and "ultimate" order in a manner that answers questions of authority
and power in rhetorical situations, and compliments Asante and Atwater's discussion of
structure. Dialectic, he says, too easily becomes "parliamentary conflict" where the field of
communication is dissonant, with competing voices "in a jangling relation with one
another." O n the other hand, if there could exist an "ultimate" order in rhetorical practice,
then the competing, jangling voices would be placed in "a hierarchy, or sequence, or evaluative
series, so that, in some way, we w e n t by a fixed and reasoned progression from one of these
to another, the members of the entire group being arranged developmentally with relation to
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one another." In other words, there would be some kind of "guiding idea" behind "the
diversity of voices" (187). This, he goes on to say, is why Marxism distilled so easily on the
minds of the working class: they saw themselves as integral parts of a system or order that
had an ultimate goal. The teleology of the shared goal informed and enriched their cultural
discursive practices.
While careful not to wrest Burke's text too much here, I can see how Burke's
"ultimate" order invites a "know your place" philosophy, much like in Plato's perfect
republic (King 90). Such a philosophy is always governed by some kind of sovereignty,
somebody or something with power to call the shots, or, more importantly here, to organize
and perpetuate the hierarchy—with lesser mortals falling dutifully into their places. In fact,
elsewhere Burke has said that one of the most fundamental of human natures is to exist in
hierarchy. This is not necessarily negative; in a democracy, the body sovereign is (or is
supposed to be) the People, who have power to relinquish power and bestow it on
representatives. In Burke's terms, election time—if it is free and fair—can be seen as one
step in an evaluative series or a sequence that determines sovereignty and authority. Order, then,
is necessary for rhetorical action, though the ultimate goal in Burke's thinking is to minimize
or eliminate tyrannical hierarchies or hegemonies (Cheney, Doxas and Torrens 140).
The concept of power becomes essential in understanding any rhetorical situation,
especially those situations involving hierarchical institutions like universities. In his work
Discourses of Power, Barry Hindness argues that there have been two competing concepts of
power in history, one seeing power as a quantitative capacity (such as electricity), and the
other fixing power in a dynamic relationship, where power is a right made legitimate by
consent, and not a quantifiable force (1-10). In the first instance we have power as Max
Weber defined it: power {macht) "is the probability that one actor within a social relationship
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will be in a position to carry out his own will despite resistance, regardless of the basis on
which this probability rests" (15). In a similar vein, Bertrand Russell defined power as "the
capacity to realize our desires," in spite of resistance (in King 137). Preachers of this gospel
of power, like Machiavelli, H o b b e s , Marx, and Nietzsche, have ultimately been concerned
with the way power can be used to bring into subjection weaker souls. T h e long and sad
story of history, you could say, has been one of unequal power relations, the result of which
has been human suffering (Hindness 2).
In rhetorical situations, this concept of power suggests that when the outcome will
be some kind of action (as in deliberative or judicial rhetoric), participants with the most
power can, if they want, carry out their own desire in spite of the good arguments of the
weaker participant (think of the plea of someone w h o is to be executed by a monarch's
decree). Rhetorically, conditions or constraints of power are all-encompassing and, as Weber
explained, determine what subjects see and feel and, it could be added, say (Sennett 20). O n e
could argue that, in extreme instances of such power, there is litde or n o rhetoric because the
point of discourse is not to persuade at all, since the participation of the weaker agents is not
necessary to carry out the act, since force can be used. In such extreme (and, sadly, common)
cases, there is n o consent, there is n o argument with reasons, there is n o deliberation. This is
the kind of power that terrified the colonial fathers of the United States.
T h e concept of power as something that can be quantified and increased and
exercised works well, as I have said, in hierarchical communities like colleges. As I
mentioned at the beginning of the chapter, the culmination of campus dissent may have
been war protest, b u t the root was dissatisfaction with what was seen as administrative
tyranny in loco parentis, or administrator as surrogate parent. In 1969 Michael Walzer,
intellectual of the N e w Left and editor of Dissent magazine, explained the problem in a way

43

that resonates with the structural concept of Asante and Atwater. Universities function, he
said, as "mediated corporate bodies" that, unlike the government of the state, have
authorities "rarely legitimized in any democratic fashion" (396). "These officers," he
continued, "preside over what are essentially authoritarian regimes, with no internal electoral
system, no opposition parties, no free press or open communications network, no
established judicial procedures, etc. etc. . . .," and therefore no legitimate power (396). We
allow systems like university administrations to rule over us by the theory of tacit consent,
wherein corporate subjects submit themselves to corporate rule (397). Tacit consent,
however, is no excuse in Walzer's thinking to keep students from their civil rights. And the
more "private and autocratic" the university head was, "the more angry, perhaps violent, the
[student] revolt will be" (406).
So dissident students in the Sixties wanted a say in what they were learning, and they
weren't getting any. It seemed the powers-that-were exercised all power over the education
the students were paying for. Not only did their superiors have power over what students
were taught, they also exerted power and control over how they lived their lives—where they
lived, how they dressed, and what they said on (and sometimes off) campus.
The idea of in loco parentiswas not new in the 1960s. The governing bodies of the
earliest schools in America, like Harvard and Yale, had been based on a patriarchal didactic
system where the school president functioned as the dutiful father nurturing and controlling
his sons. (And at the time, they were all sons) Students of these early systems could thank
John Locke for the concept of parentalpower, which posited that "children" were not equal
subjects, but were naturally and temporarily subjected to their parents (Locke 31). The
administration of the classical college functioned under Locke's concept of parental power.
Administrators, Bloustein explains, "came to act in lieu of parents, empowered by law,
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custom and usage to direct and control student conduct to the same extent a parent could"
(46). The president of the classical college became the. paterfamilias:
The fitting image is of the college president as the academic father and students as
the dutiful children of learning: wise in his choice of what the young ones were to
study; dedicated and enlightened in his mission as moral guardian over them; stern
but just as their disciplinarian; and yet a man sufficiently attached to life's joy, to
provide his youth with wholesome and healthy—necessarily nonsexual—outlets for
fun and games. (46)
Bloustein may wax flippant here, but this is not much of an exaggeration. The student of the
19f century accepted this familial hierarchy of power, positioned himself into the role of
child, the potter's clay, or he did not stay in college. As part of the "orbital harmony" of the
university where each person knew "their own place" (Bloustein 46), the submissive student
entered a rhetorical field in which the "ultimate order," in Burke's terms, descended from
the father (the administrator) to the son (the student).
Not surprisingly, in the 20th century this idea of in loco parentis became noisome and
intolerable to the modern student. Particularly in the Sixties when cultural trends were
leading youth to a more libertarian lifestyle, the paternal power of the administration in the
university had to go. In 1968 Margaret Mead, the famous anthropologist, recognized in the
rhetorical field of protest the "inherent structural constraints" spoken of by Asante and
Atwater. Student rhetorical "hyperactivism," so-called, was merely a response to the exigence
of parental control: "Every detail of their lives—where they sleep, what they eat, what they
wear—has been . . . subject to college authority" (171). In the mid-Sixties, over one quarter
of America's campuses reported some kind of protest against this type of control over
students' lives (Henieman 106). Carried to extremes, the way administrators kept students
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under control and surveillance in the classical model had parallels with Jeremy Bentham's
panopticon prison complex, which placed its subjects completely at the mercy of the
surrogate parent (Sennett 58). Also using the panopticon in his theoretical discussions,
Foucault has pointed out the didactic function of prison reform in the 19 th century. State
discipline shifted from torturing prisoners to supervising their every move, thus neutralizing
the criminal tendencies and transforming them into socially safe creatures (Discipline and
Punish 18). It was this form of paternal supervision and moral didactic discipline that so
inflamed college students of the Sixties. Students b o t h conservative and liberal united against
it (Heineman Campus Wars 148).
As Asante and Atwater have shown, the hierarchies or systems of power in rhetorical
situations are themselves rhetorical. T h e system of in loco parentis acted rhetorically, even
without a specific discourse. The familial/patriarchal system was a discourse in itself, and
indeed that is what Michel Foucault has discussed in his essays on power. Foucault has been
criticized for reducing every social relationship, whether hierarchical or otherwise, to a
struggle of power. However, recent scholarship argues that Foucault did not believe that all
relations reduced to power, but simply "that power is present in all social relations" (Lynch
66). In Foucault's work we see explicidy what is found implicitly in Burke's discussion of
order and rhetoric—that power is simply the modus of getting things done.
Power/ Knowledge, a collection of Foucault's interviews and essays, deals direcdy with
the operations of power in social situations. T h o u g h he does n o t speak direcdy in rhetorical
terms, he is addressing precisely what I am addressing here: h o w power affects discursive
practices in rhetorical situations (like college campuses). In every society there exists
"manifold relations of p o w e r " which "characterize and constitute the social body," and
create within themselves rhetorical discourse {Power/Knowledge 93). Furthermore, there can
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exist n o order, n o hierarchy, n o relation of power without a correlating "economy of
discourses of truth" (93). T h e best way to understand how power creates discourse,
according to Foucault, is n o t to analyze a rhetorical situation through time, as Eugene White
assumed with the historical neologism exigentialflow, but through "the use of spatial, strategic
metaphors" that call to m i n d relationships, location, place, order, position (70). In this sense,
power is n o t a repressive force but a creative force: the way it is used in the hierarchy creates
knowledge, "regimes of truth," and group identity (131). " T h e university hierarchy,"
Foucault explains, "is only the most visible, the most sclerotic and least dangerous form of
this p h e n o m e n o n " (52).
T h e connection of Foucault's concept of power/knowledge to Burke's concept of
identification is significant here. W h e n Foucault explains the shift from torture to
surveillance, he explains that the focus of discipline conversely shifted from the offense to
the individual, to correcting n o t only what criminals do but also "what they are, will be, may
b e " {Discipline and Punish 18). In an image that may seem violent, Foucault explains how
power's capillary form of existence "reaches into the very grain of individuals, touches their
bodies and inserts itself into their actions and attitudes, their discourses, learning processes
and everyday lives" (Power/'Knowledge 39). Identity is a product of "a relation of power
exercised over bodies" (74). Foucault uses the word "bodies" to refer to the souls of
subjects—their identities. It is not much of a stretch, then, to change Foucault's
power/knowledge c o m p o u n d to power/'identification', in other words, power creates identity (or
forces identity in an act of rhetorical work).
For example, implied in the university hierarchical power oi in loco parentis is the idea
of family identity. T h e administrator is the father and the students are the children. Their
consubstantiality, though metaphorical, is formed in the family relationship of the university.
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However, as in Locke's paternal power theory, there is no equality of power in the family.
The children in the relationship do not have equal opportunity to create communal identity.
Obviously, we are still discussing the first theory of power presented by Hindess—that of
power as a quantifiable, scarce commodity, unshared (or, at least, unequally shared).
While other student bodies across America protested first against in loco parentis and
then next against seemingly corrupt foreign policy in Southeast Asia, Brigham Young
University authorities perpetuated the classical college model, with no apparent opposition
from the student body. In discourses and policies that might have set Berkeley or Columbia
on fire, Ernest Wilkinson, one-time lawyer and devout cold warrior, seemed to remind BYU
students over and over that they were not in control of the discourse and that they did not
have the power to create identity through rhetorical exchange. In retrospect, it is apparent
that Wilkinson and the school administrators controlled discursive practice during the
Vietnam Era through the exercise of hierarchical power and, its corollary, identification and
identity.
As discussed in the last chapter, it was the goal of BYU administrators and the board
of trustees to reinforce an identity of conservatism, vehement anticommunism, patriotism
and tranquility in the students during the Vietnam era. In order to ensure this identity, the
Wilkinson administration enacted policies of control that illustrate the power principle in
rhetorical situations. These policies, enacted in the authoritarian style that Walzer indicated,
preserved that identity by hedging the discursive practices of the students. Each policy,
coming from the top down, reinforced the way BYU identified itself rhetorically in the
power/identification compound I have suggested.
During his welcome speech in September 1965, "Make Honor Your Standard,"
Wilkinson reminded students of their commitment to accept LDS standards and "moral
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ideals." As a response, no doubt, to alarming campus riots at Berkeley, Wisconsin, and
Michigan, these standards included a new strict definition of a riot as "two or more persons
getting together and doing something to breach the peace" ("Speeches of the Year" 8). Any
student participating in a riot would be immediately dismissed. Wilkinson then explained that
though rebellious behavior seemed harmless, the reputation of the university was at stake.
"Had that [suspension of students] been done at the beginning of the University of
California," he explained, "there would have been no long, continuous riots" (9).
The process of identification through administrative policy and rhetoric continued
throughout the era. In 1966, almost beyond belief, Wilkinson encouraged a handful of
students to spy on teachers presumed to have liberal political views (Bergera and Priddis
207-209). Later Wilkinson explained that he had only been exercising prudence in
demanding hard evidence to back up student complaints (Wilkinson and Arrington 775).
The incident exploded. The teachers found out, started their own investigations and filed
formal complaints, and a few students contacted radio and television stations and
newspapers about the incident (Bergera and Priddis 214). The tightness or wrongness of this
incident is not important here. Wilkinson's later comment that the whole incident "resulted
in bad publicity for the University and for [myself]" is most telling in terms of the anxiety the
administration felt over the way BYU looked to the world and the way the institution as an
entity identified itself rhetorically (775).
Also, Wilkinson increased his power and the rhetorical might of the administration
by placing certain students under surveillance. Paralleling Bentham's panopticon and
Foucault's theories of surveillance, Wilkinson in the late 1960s encouraged administrators to
keep a close watch on apparent "radical" students who may have sympathized with
communism (Bergera and Priddis 185). There is no telling whether the student body at large
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was aware of such surveillance; one can speculate that there would have been plenty of
resistance. Even at BYU, the important point is that the path to identification with
conservative values was clearly hedged, and competing discourse or behavior (is there a
difference?) was muffled.
In 1967, the year in which a BYU undergraduate pinned his draft card to his shirt to
"protest against protesters," the administration announced an annual "American Week," and
then later "Military Week" to show patriotic support for the country (Bergera and Priddis
181). T h e next year, after sixty BYU students came to a speech by conservative vicepresidential candidate Curtis LeMay with black armbands and sought to disrupt the speech,
school administrators adopted a civil disturbance plan, which included a suggested riot squad
and contingent plans for protection of campus radio and television stations against hostile
takeovers (184). It is also interesting to note that during this later period of the Sixties,
Wilkinson and the administration refused the invitation of certain speakers to address the
student body. Speakers w h o had atheist or subversive tendencies, or w h o had any
connection to Russia or w h o strayed from the path of "strict morality" were prohibited from
speaking in the weekly forum. W h e n presidential candidate Robert F. Kennedy came to
speak, the administration refused to cancel classes (199-200). 15,000 students showed up
anyway. Regardless of these efforts, the majority of students in a poll responded that
viewpoints contrary to the school and the Church should be represented on campus (see
Bergera and Priddis 200).
In 1968 a request for a BYU chapter of Students for a Democratic Society was
rejected. In 1969, the administration told undergraduates in the dormitories to remove peace
signs from their w i n d o w s — " J u s t do it," the administration wrote in the student newspaper,
' Y o u don't need a reason" (Bergera and Priddis 186). In 1970, the administration made
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policies against the signing of political petitions on campus and halted a petition for U.S.
withdrawal from Vietnam, though a few years earlier Wilkinson himself had signed a petition
addressed to Lyndon B. J o h n s o n supporting the war (Magdiel 12). Also that year, the
administration ruled that political literature could not be distributed on campus and that a
series of antiwar plays called "Guerilla Theater" be banned from campus (15-16).
T h e university organ, the Daily Universe, also fell into administrative control during this era. It
should not shock anyone to learn that a university sponsored by a conservative church
would exert some control over what is said in its newspaper. Student newspapers in every
college have been traditionally, in some degree, monitored and censored by faculty, and for
good reason. However, with the rising revolt against in loco parentis the American Association
of University Professors and other academic groups in June 1967 drafted a "Joint Statement
on Rights and Freedoms of Students," which included the provision that student newspapers
should be independent from the university, b o t h financially and creatively. Furthermore, the
student press, according to the statement, "should be free of censorship and advance
approval of copy" (373), which would add to the discourse an integrity valuable to the
school and the country.
T h e Daily Universe began in an environment of independence. According to Bryan
Waterman and Brian Kagel, b o t h editors of BYU student newspapers in the 1990s (and, in
their work The lord's University, grinding axes to the nub), in 1921, under the name

YNews,

student editors boasted that they would "criticize wherever and whenever we deem it to be
the most expedient policy, regardless of whose toes we might step o n " (73). Early in his
administration, Wilkinson himself recognized the importance of having a free press on
campus. But as student protest discourse in the Sixties intensified its connections to
communism, anti-Americanism, and the counterculture, BYU administrators sought to move
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the Daily Universe, as it was then called, from student control to faculty control in the
communications department. By 1972, under the direction of Dallin H. Oaks, the new
school president, the paper had been formally moved (83).
The trend of tightening administrative control over community identification and
student discourse at BYU is quite singular considering its historical context. During this
time, other universities, though intolerant of violence and destruction, were moving away
from in loco parentis and granting students more independence, more voice, more rhetorical
power (a trend praised by critics like Michael Walzer and lamented recently by conservative
scholars like Allan Bloom and Roger Kimball). BYU's administration seemed to be moving
in the exact opposite direction, and exulted publicly in that move. Brigham Young University
had a divine calling; it was the Lord's University. And as such, it had a unique identity to
perpetuate in rhetorical exchange. In a letter to parents, Wilkinson explained, "There are
many disturbing influences at work on college campuses against which BYU is determined
to hold the line" ("Welcome Address" 1968). In an address to students in February 1970
called "The Unique Role of BYU Among Universities in America," he said that the primary
focus of education was building strong moral character—an idea lost by other churchfounded institutions like Harvard, Columbia, and Stanford ("Speeches of the Year" 3-4).
Also in this address Wilkinson made explicit the group identity of BYU and the role
of administrators and faculty as the loving parents away from home. As loving parents,
administrators had a responsibility to look into the affairs of students, both on and off
campus. "This attitude may seem old," said Wilkinson, especially "in a day when great
numbers of universities and colleges have abandoned any attempt to supervise the moral
lives of their students" (Welcome address Sept. 1968, p. 11). However, the hierarchy of BYU
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would continue to function during the crisis of the Sixties in a rhetorically familial pattern, as
Wilkinson explained to students in February 1970:
Our BYU family allows us to choose whether or not to belong, but if we become
members, our responsibilities are as real as to our families at home. Your own
natural parents expect this of us, and as your alma paterae, d o n o t intend to fail them.
If our emphasis on standards has an old-fashioned ring to some of you, parents
always seem a bit behind the times. (9)
"It may be frustrating," he continued, "to have someone care about everything you do," but
that was the nature of family. T h e n Wilkinson made the exclusionary nature of the BYU
family very clear: "If there be any of you w h o reject this concept [of in loco parentis you will
be responsible for ostracizing yourselves from our society" (9).
Again, I am speaking here of the concept of quantifiable rhetorical power—power
that one can wield over another, power that one can exercise to define terms of
identification in rhetorical situations. Such power creates identity, identity suggests power. In
Burkean terms the power of Wilkinson's analogy of family has to do with "familial" or
"tribal" definitions of substance; the powerful rhetorician identifies with the subject by
pointing to shared substance—consubtantiality—"in terms of ancestral cause" (GM 26). In
the classical college, this rhetorical device—the administrator speaking of the college as a
family—was accepted though perhaps not addressed specifically or publicly. A t BYU in the
Sixties, Wilkinson made the familial relationship concrete and public.
I have n o t yet covered the second understanding of power that Hindess discusses in
Discourses of Power. It makes sense to make a transition here by asking the question, H o w did
Wilkinson get such rhetorical power? For Wilkinson, the question is not as easy to answer as
with other university heads. F r o m its inception, BYU has been intimately connected to T h e
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Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints and the hierarchy of authority there. Church
authorities are not elected; they are called by revelation and then accepted by a general vote
by the laity. (However, church leaders are not answerable to the laity. I will address this
below.) Therefore, Ernest Wilkinson was appointed to his position in 1951 by Church
president and prophet David O. McKay. Since the Latter-day Saints are encouraged to
support the policies and doctrines of the president of the Church, who acts under the
direction of God, it was not a leap for BYU students to assume that Wilkinson's
appointment had divine origins. Assuming that connection, it is also no surprise to discover
that during the Sixties, BYU was in lock-step with its board of trustees,, the Twelve Apostles
of the Church. Heading that group was President McKay (of whom it would be an
understatement to say that he was no friend of communism). Other church officials in
official pronouncements like General Conference sermons had either criticized communism
or supported law and order and the Vietnam War effort (see for example Boyd K. Packer's
address, "The Member and the Military"). So naturally, Wilkinson both criticized
communism and supported the war effort. "This war," he said in 1968 to a battalion of army
reservists, "is as 'moral and just' as any war in which we have been engaged" (Earnestly Yours
74). He then gave his opinion that any college student who thought the war was immoral or
unjust did not know enough about American heritage to graduate from college (79-80). In
the order of things, there was complete consensus between the Church and BYU officials.
The hierarchy acted in tandem.
For BYU students, ninety-five percent of whom were LDS, the hierarchy itself was
rhetorical: It made all the difference in the world when church official David B. Haight
reminded students in 1968 that the school was run by a man who was called and
enthusiastically supported by a "living prophet" ("Welcome Address"). A particular Burkean

54
"ultimate order" was established. Students were invited to find their place in its orbit and
support the rhetorical creation of identity, which Wilkinson himself discussed in words of
uncanny resemblance to this discussion of rhetoric and power:
While this University is a part of the Church, we need to understand that the
University maintains an identity and a particular image as an oasis of learning in a
turbulent world. In order to maintain this image, the University administration and
the General Authorities [of the Church] have the responsibility of defining the
standards which will properly sustain this image and the basic virtue of modesty,
which we have done. . . . I think you students are just as anxious as I to preserve that
reputation, and I am sure that together we can say that there will still be n o riots on
this campus. ("Welcome Address" 1970, 10).
There were complaints, of course. Even to the US News and World Report, a few students said
they resented "being treated like children" (58). In a letter to the editor of the Daily Universe,
one student said he was "angry because of the invisible iron glove that keeps us in our place;
angry with the kind of education that teaches us to 'accept' rather than discover; angered by
words praising us for our silence, words that have undertones of warning" (Bergera and
Priddis 186-187). Even at BYU the students could feel the flexing of power over their
bodies, over their "acts, attitudes and modes of everyday behavior" (Foucault,
Power/Knowledge 125). A n d yet, the students at Brigham Y o u n g University (and every other
American school during the Sixties) chose to be there. They were not forced to go to the
school, accept the rules, or succumb to the powers of Wilkinson and the administration.
Attending BYU was for them an exercise of their agency; "By the very act of registering,"
said Wilkinson, "[the student] agrees to abide by all rules" ("Welcome Address" 1970, 11). In
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other words, they chose to enter a rhetorical situation in which the balance of rhetorical power
would not be in their favor.
This concept of agency, I believe, is the gadfly of any discussion of power as a
quantitative and singular force. Power, it is assumed, can be increased until weaker bodies
are brought into complete subjection. In their revision of Bitzer's situational theory, Asante
and Atwater seem to fall back on a discourse of "victimage" to explain power in rhetorical
theory. According to these scholars, in rhetorical situations where the governing power
oppresses the weaker power, there are only two courses of action the repressed bodies can
take: 1) they can continue to represent the most logical and truthful course of action, and
thereby gain victory by integrity and reasonableness, or 2) they can adopt a course of
"guerilla rhetoric" which means "multifrontal verbal attacks on the structural symbol" such
as "non-negotiable demands" (176). How non-negotiable demands can be rhetorical, Asante
and Atwater do not say. Yet their theoretical weakness is not in their concept of rhetorical
resistance, but in their dismissal of agency and choice in rhetorical situations, particularly in
situations of voluntary association in democratic societies.
In voluntary political societies the members willingly relinquish some of their power
to participate in the community. This is the Lockean concept of power upon which the
United States government is based. It is also a principle of power, I would argue, partly
understood by Foucault. As Bevir points out, Foucault may seem to imply that all bodies are
victims of some kind of power and that the freedom to escape, muffle, reroute or disrupt
that power and "truly make ourselves" is an illusion (354). However, Bevir believes
Foucault's theory of power leaves room for the agency of the subject: "To deny that subjects
can escape from all social influences is not to deny that they can act creatively for reasons
that make sense to them" (358). Furthermore Foucault, unlike his Marxist contemporaries,

56

did not ascribe to the State unlimited power, but taught that authoritative power could take
hold only in "a whole series of multiple and indefinite power relations" that subjects also
help define (Power/Knowledge 122). While discussing discourses and situations of power it
should be evident that even weaker subjects possess the capacity "to select particular beliefs
and actions" that might affect the situation and bring about change (Bevir 358).
I hasten to add that this reading of Foucault is not shared by everyone. Sara Mills
recendy argued that post-structuralist thinking runs counter to the liberal humanist ideology
and its notion "of individual self with agency and control over i t s e l f (34). Since there is n o
" s e l f (in this reading), there can be no choice—only a constant flux of selfhood that is
beyond the control of the subject. T h o u g h Mills makes this argument, she concedes that
Foucault's notion of subjectivity did not stay the same over time, but changed and evolved
over the course of his scholarship (34). Furthermore, Mills modifies (or clarifies?) Foucault's
concept of subjectivity by arguing that subjects do in fact participate in the negotiation of
power by constantly evaluating, considering, adopting, or criticizing their positions in
discourses of power (97). Foucault himself, in an interview titled "Confessions of the Flesh,"
bewilderingly renames power apparatus—to reflect, I suppose, multivalent and strategic facets
of power's application in institutions—and, through emphasizing the heterogeneous nature
of power, concedes finally that "there has to be a capillary from below to above at the same
time" there is a capillary from above to below (201). Apparently, Foucault believed that even
the seemingly oppressed subjects participate in a "tete-a-tete" with the distributors of the
apparatus (201). Scholars like Mills, as well as Foucault's interviewers for "Confessions of
the Flesh," have realized the complexity and paradox of Foucault's theory of power and its
relationship among subjects, especially when the word "relationship" suggests potentiality to
act evident in all participants (though Foucault may occasionally say otherwise).
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I believe Mills tries to keep Foucault's theory from collapsing under the difficulty of
agency by showing that power is something negotiated "in each interaction [between
subjects] and is never fixed and stable" (39). How, then, can subjects negotiate power in
voluntary rhetorical situations if there is n o agency?
In other words, it is dismissive to discuss the power relationship at BYU as a
totalitarian relationship. Students participated in the discourse of conservative identity by
entering freely the region or domain (Foucault's words) of the University and, in the very act,
exercised their power by relinquishing it to Wilkinson and the administration. In some sense,
they had to know what they were getting themselves into; at some level, they had to
recognize they were taking on a new identity, a communal ethos, which they could not
completely control.
This is close to (but not exacdy) the second, non-quantitative understanding of
power discussed by Hindess. In this view, power is n o t just a simple capacity or "will to act,"
but a legitimate capacity granted to a body or bodies by other bodies (10). Therefore, in cases
of apparent sovereign power, we must realize that the power of the sovereign is granted
through consent, cooperation, and contract. It is a collaborative process contingent on many
participants and a multitude of factors. O n the matter of sovereignty itself, Foucault said,
famously, that "we need to cut off the King's head" and get beyond the idea that one body
holds the reins of power over many bodies without remedy {Power/Knowledge 123). In fact,
Foucault does n o t believe that power is localized in one place at all, which he explains in
Power I Knowledge:
Power must be analysed [sic] as something which circulates, or rather as something
which only functions in the form of a chain. It is never localized here or there, never
in anybody's hands, never appropriated as a commodity or piece of wealth. Power is
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employed and exercised through a net-like organization. A n d n o t only do individuals
circulate between its threads; they are always in the position of simultaneously
undergoing and exercising this power. . . . individuals are the vehicles of power, not
its points of application. (98)
This should make sense in rhetorical situations. For, even at the least, power is inflected in
the auditors w h o can listen, understand, and ultimately accept or reject what is being said.
Even in uneven rhetorical situations, like the one we have discussed at BYU, power is not
"inflicted" on those w h o have none, but in Foucault's reasoning "invests them, is
transmitted by them and through them; it exerts pressure u p o n them, just as they
themselves, in their struggle against it, resist the grip it has on t h e m " (Discipline and Punish
27). A n d that even assumes that they want to resist; in many cases the auditors or weaker
rhetorical bodies assent (in Booth's words) to the will, arguments, policies or whatever of the
greater body. Foucault is adamant that subjects have some degree of influence in the dance
of power and, like prisms with light, can change the direction and dynamic of power in
rhetorical situations (Power/Knowledge 72).
Acknowledging, now, that in voluntary organizations the exercise of power exists in
relationships and not in individuals, perhaps it makes m o r e sense to substitute the word
authority for power w h e n discussing Wilkinson's rhetorical force (though that word too is
loaded). Current definitions of authority diverge from traditional definitions of power and
move more to a cooperative understanding: "Authority is the right to command, and
correlatively the right to be obeyed. It must be distinguished from power, which is the ability
to compel compliance, either through the use or the threat of force" (Wolfe 20); an authority
is "someone w h o has strength and uses it to guide others through disciplining them,
changing h o w they act by reference to a higher standard" (Sennett 15); it is "the power in
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charge of unifying common action through rules binding for all" (Simon 48); it is a system in
which "some kind of democratic legitimacy is always necessary" (Walzer 406); "Authority is
legitimate power, power that is stable, because it is felt to be right and good to obey it"
(King 145); finally, it is a power which "exists when one individual or group is perceived by
another as having an assigned position—somewhat like a charter or social contract" (Bowers
13). If we accept that with authority comes some degree of power, then each of these
definitions hint at the concept of legitimate or shared power discussed by Hindess and
elaborated by Foucault, in that they reflect the reciprocal, non-quantitative definition.
Authority is something granted, not wielded. When subjects (willingly) recognize authority,
you could say it is an act of identification—they acknowledge consubstantial goals with the
governing body.
It would appear that seeing power as a legitimate capacity, rather than simply a
capacity, makes much more sense in discussing rhetorical situations, particularly when
considering the power of identification to exact persuasion. Especially after having reviewed
the rhetoric-epistemic debate, it is clear that meaning and action are created in systems of
social symbolic construction—social-epistemic. I suppose we must concede with Richard
Vatz that the rhetor—the one who "has the conch," so to speak—has first crack at creating
meaning out of thin air with symbols. Within certain Bitzerean constraints, the rhetor
decides what to make salient at that point. But if there is no "universal locus of appeal," no
generally accepted form of authority or deference, then in a Burkean sense there can be no
collaborative identification (RM 59). The process of identification, if collaborative,
transcends the hierarchy and will lead to group advantage (61).
According to Andrew King, true rhetorical power comes from organized networks
or groups. These groups have constituents who share "all potential ingredients for
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mobilization" like common habits and world views (48). The consubstantiality of the group
creates real rhetorical power to collaborate in situations of crisis. In terms that echo Burke,
King explains this rhetorical phenomenon:
Probably the most important source of a group's power is its sense of identity.
Dominant groups are bound together by common interests, habits, values,
aspirations, interpretations of the past, and agreement on basic decisions. Group
identity is made up of common prejudices and shared images of the world and of the
group's role in it. In addition, they may share a common language or argot, and
distinctive rituals and procedures. Power is fundamentally a psycho-social unity, a
"we" feeling. The degree of group power depends upon the homogeneity of
common images and the intensity of attachment to consensual beliefs. (49)
The "we" feeling mentioned here connects with Burke's concept of "corporate identity"
mentioned in the last chapter. Again, identification is not an individual process, and the
more the individual identifies with the "collective might" of the group, the more powerful
that group will be rhetorically (Burke "Responsibilities of National Greatness" 46). Not only
does the identification of the audience increase the rhetor's power to reconstitute group
identity, it also increases the power of the audience/participants to "make themselves" with
their own agency (Hammerback 21).
Therefore when considering campus dissent and the operations of power, you could
say that rhetoric failed in the Sixties due to the failure of group cohesion and
consubstantiality between administrators and students. At one time, students could easily
identify with teachers and administrators as role models and authorities, but as the
authorities continued in loco parentis and heavy-handed surveillance, the once positive side of
the identification process self-destructed (King 154). Students turned from dialogue and
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pursued m o r e radical, nihilistic, counter-cultural, and violent forms of communication, if we
can call those forms communication. A n d as students identified themselves more and more
with the counter-culture in the late Sixties, they too lost rhetorical power to convince
middle-road America, or anyone for that matter, that the conflict in Vietnam should be
stopped (Gustainis and H a h n 214). W h a t they had was a failure to identify. They didn't want
to identify, really, but the lack of homogeneity or psycho-social unity, in King's words,
diffused the rhetorical power of all participants and turned the rhetorical situation into
violence and police action, rather than discursive cooperation.
So why the calm on the campus of BYU in the late Sixties? Simply, it was group
identification. O n e would be hard-pressed to discover a campus more homogenous and
prone to psycho-social unity than Brigham Young University in Provo, Utah. More than
ninety-five percent of the students and faculty belonged to the same religious organization.
They practiced the same religious habits, enjoyed the same rituals, participated in a very
similar culture of belief. In 1978 a scientific survey revealed that throughout the twentieth
century, the students at BYU became consistently more orthodox, more conservative in
values, and more homogenous in nature (Christensen and Cannon 54). Another study during
the Vietnam war, after Tet, indicated that nearly eighty percent of the student body agreed
that the US forces had to achieve victory in Vietnam as defender of world democracy
(Larsen and Schwendiman 155). In a sense, once students signed their acceptance of the
honor code and the school's rules, they actively relinquished any individual identity that ran
counter to the group's identity. Wilkinson made this very clear w h e n he spoke of the BYU
"family" in his 1970 address; anyone unwilling to participate in the group identity would be
ostracized from the society (which coincides with King's discussion of the "pathological
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state" of alienation, 6). For this address, Wilkinson received a lengthy standing ovation from
the student body.
The historical data seem to indicate that as participants in social unity, BYU students
accepted the destiny of the University as a divine organ in the purposes of G o d , which also
means that they assented to the authority of Ernest Wilkinson, w h o m they saw as (indirectly)
divinely called. Here we must diverge from the c o m m o n understanding of authority in
democratic institutions and acknowledge BYU's unique rhetorical situation. It is true that in
one sense, the ordained officers of the L D S church and their appointed assistants are
sustained by a raise of hands by the congregation at large. However, church leaders are not
answerable to their constituents; their employer is not of this world. There is n o t space in
this study for a thorough treatment of the subject, but it is important to note that the kind of
authority (and the power nexus formed from it) is qualitatively different. Acceptance of
ecclesiastical authority is to M o r m o n s an act of faith, not a necessary evil. Yet this does not
change the fact that M o r m o n students at Brigham Young University willingly embraced a
communal ethos, cheerfully entered a power relationship that did n o t favor them, and
actively participated in creating a group identity by attending the university and refraining
from revolt during the Vietnam Era.
In 1968 BYU student T a m m y Tanaka wrote a communications thesis whose tide is
as descriptive as the thesis itself: "Why N o Revolts at BYU: T h e Silent Language of the
M o r m o n World-View and Patriotism at Brigham Young University." Based on Edward T.
Hall's theory of "silent language," Tanaka contrasted the world-view of the N e w Radicals
with that of LDS-dominated student body at BYU. "Through the sensory screen of the
M o r m o n World-View," she wrote, "contemporary social problems and the methods for
solving them appear different than they d o from the sensory screen of the N e w Radicals"
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(14). Throughout the thesis, Tanaka works on a Burkean assumption that she does not make
explicit—that the student body identified whole-heartedly with the administration. She does,
however, show that the calm of the campus had just as much to do with the students as it
did with the authoritarian administration:
It seems the prevailing attitudes and behavior of BYU students do not result
specifically from the pressure of any one element of the culture [like a powerful
administrative head]. Rather, it seems the cumulative effect of the interaction of all
elements in the BYU environment, which seems to generate a pervasive atmosphere,
energy or mood referred to by those familiar with it as the 'Spirit of the Y'" (41).
To connect Tanaka's work with this discussion, and in conclusion, in order to understand
the operations of power at BYU during the rhetorical situation of the Sixties, it will be most
helpful to see power as Foucault saw it—as "a network of relations, constandy in tension, in
activity" rather than "a privilege that one might possess" and exercise at will {Discipline and
Punish 26). Identification can be instigated, obviously, by a powerful rhetor who can remind,
admonish, even threaten to induce the audience to accept and coalesce. Certainly Ernest
Wilkinson had that influence, and BYU students did not have equal rhetorical power to
discuss the war in any sense. Yet in most voluntary rhetorical situations, as at BYU during
the Sixties, the most effective consubstantiation is cooperative and communal; or, as
Antczak explains in Thought and Character, the most successful democratic rhetoric constitutes
"a mutual ^constitution

of thought and character" (11, my emphasis). Then, with that in

mind, we understand why in Wilkinson's speech to the student body in 1969, the year of the
most campus violence and unrest and protest and dissent, he could ask to see whether the
students supported law and order and the US government, and all stood in assent. Wilkinson
would not have been successful rhetorically if he did not share the same orientation and
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identity as the student body. The students saw in him not only a leader, but an identity that
they too, whether they fully recognized it or not, adopted.
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CONCLUSION
T h e Moral D i m e n s i o n of Identification
It is my hope that I have introduced a new way of understanding the apparent
tranquility of the campus of Brigham Young University during the turbulence of the Sixties.
During those "days of rage," BYU did n o t have any significant demonstrations, petitions, or
rebellions to protest the heavy-handed nature of college administrations or America's
involvement with Vietnam. Having reviewed some of the policies and discourse of the
Wilkinson administration, we can see that the calmness of the campus community had so
much to do with who attended BYU and who ran BYU, rather than what circumstances made
up the Vietnam era situation. In rhetorical situations, when certain outside forces apply
pressure to communities and force u p o n them certain pressing exigencies, rhetors and
audiences can create strong solidarity through group ethos and identification—through the
uniting of their souls. Ernest Wilkinson, president of BYU in the Sixties, through his
seemingly heavy-handed administration, ensured a conservative and patriotic identity in his
students that created an environment of tranquility and obedience. Conversely, the great
majority of BYU students exercised their own power by embracing that conservative image
and sharing, consubstantially, in a communal soul that identified against the Sixties
counterculture of rebellion in dress and behavior and identified with the conservative and
patriotic "silent majority" in America.
Though I am in n o position to judge the identification practices of the students at
BYU (or anywhere else, for that matter), there is a moral dimension to the rhetorical practice
of identification that makes a fitting conclusion to this study. According to one Burkean
synthesizer, Burke's most basic contribution to the philosophy of rhetoric is his discussions
of substance, of shared substances, of unity and consubstantiality of bodies (Hochmuth 137).
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Yet within his discussions of consubstantiality and identity is an ethical and moral dimension
sometimes overlooked in the literature. It is true that the heart of identification is positive;
there is unity, community, shared interests, equality, and cooperation (Youngdahl and
Warnock 337). Yet Burke expressly indicated that with identification came dissociation,
exclusion, separation, alienation, even symbolic slaying of those with w h o m identification is
impossible (Heath 375). W h e n we identify ourselves with some, we naturally dissociate
ourselves from others, whether we like it or not. As rhetorics of polarity seem to teach us,
identification can be reductionistic—it can seal relationships that are n o t necessarily there,
and it can forge enemies that do n o t necessarily exist.
During the Vietnam conflict, Burke warned readers of The Nation of the inherent
dangers that come to citizens identified with a nation "of almost terrifyingly vast and
expansive political and economic power." For b o t h good and ill, the corporate identity
espoused in American citizenship was concrete and inescapable; but it need n o t be
unchallenged. "We may profit," Burke wTrote, 'by meditating on our personal modes of
identification with the great empire of which we all are citizens," especially w h e n that empire
makes decisions that seem to go against the grain of c o m m o n sympathies (46). T h e essence
of the Constitution of the United States itself does not require us to accept "without
question" the policies of the nation, nor does it require us to uphold at all times the
corporate "we," as in "we the people" (49). Burke challenges us to make identification a
recursive, introspective rhetorical process wherein we discover n o t only the efforts of others
to create c o m m o n substance with us, but we also reveal our own attempts at rhetorical
consubstantiality and identification with other bodies. This challenge should continue to
spur us on to more careful and conscientious rhetorical practices.
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